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INTRODUCTION
Punitive damages are an uncertain battleground today. In the
legislatures, tort reform associations joust with plaintiffs' lawyers
over a dizzying variety of proposals for change.1 In the courts, the
cases feature fact patterns ranging from overheated coffee 2 to embez-
zlement,3 and the legal issues are as diverse as constitutional due proc-
ess 4 and concerns of federalism.5 As for the public, it seems ready,
1. See infra notes 9-10, 12-17, 26-27 and accompanying text.
2. See Damage Award Cut in McDonald's Case, Hous. CHRoN., Sept. 15, 1994, at A4,
available in 1994 WL 4215906 (reporting a jury verdict of $2.9 million to a woman who
suffered third-degree burns from spillage of extremely hot coffee purchased from McDon-
ald's, as well as the judge's remittitur of all but $480,000, which was accompanied by the
judge's statement that McDonald's behavior had been "willful, wanton, reckless and ...
callous"). The case has prompted a significant volume of writing. See, e.g., Bruce
Feldthusen, Punitive Damages in Canada: Can the Coffee Ever Be Too Hot?, 17 Loy. L.A. Ir'L
& COMp. L.J. 793, 794-97, 806 (1995) (exploring the Canadian punitive-damage system and
suggesting that "[tihe Canadian regime best reflects the theoretical underpinning of tort
as understood in our [American] culture"); Susanah Mead, Punitive Damages and the Spill
Felt Round the World: A U.S. Perspective, 17 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMe. L.J. 829, 829-57, 860
(1995) (discussing the $3.5 million punitive damages in a hypothetical "coffee spill" case
and concluding that, "[i]n spite of the efforts of tort reformers and business interests .... it
is unlikely that the award of punitive damages in product liability will ever be eliminated
completely").
3. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1991) (affirming a $1.04
million punitive-damage award against an insurance company for embezzlement commit-
ted by its agent).
4. See id. at 19-24 (discussing constitutional due process); see also id. at 24-40 (ScaliaJ.,
concurring in the judgment) (detailing the history of due process).
5. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1597-98 (1996) (raising concerns
of federalism).
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perhaps even eager, to impose whopping penalties on deep-pocket
tortfeasors,6 but at the same time, cherished horror stories make many
people skeptical about the misuse of such a potent tort weapon.7
It is not surprising, therefore, that the jury still is out on the ques-
tion whether all of the "reforms" in punitive damages really are re-
forms. Some of the changes seem quite unlikely to produce
improvements.8 While one state finagles with procedural concerns
such as separate trials9 or enhanced burdens of proof,' others rewrite
jury instructions1 ' or redefine the rules of evidentiary relevance.' 2
6. See infta note 268 and accompanying text.
7. See Dick Thornburgh, America's CivilJustice Dilermma: The Prospects for Reform, 55 MD.
L. REV. 1074, 1075, 1085-86 (1996) (proposing caps, proof standards, and an enhanced
burden of proof, and citing examples of "runaway" punitive awards that make people skep-
tical of the misuse of these awards).
8. See infra Part III.B.1-2 (critiquing laws providing for net-worth evidence and for
certain kinds of caps). Another example is the widespread support for an enhanced bur-
den of proof, requiring jurors to find "clear and convincing evidence" of the conditions
authorizing punitive damage. Jan Woodward Fox & Kate McConnico, Punitive Damages in
Texas 1995: Chapter 41 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code, 21 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 21,
22-27 (1996). Assuming such a change would make any difference at all, experienced trial
lawyers may find reason to suspect that it might work contrary to its proponents' intention
by actually lowering the burden:
Though "clear and convincing" is a higher legal burden than proving liability
by a preponderance of the evidence, the new standard may work in a plaintiff's
favor for common-sense reasons. The term "by a preponderance of the evidence"
is often explained to the jury as 51% or the majority of the evidence. It could
raise in the jurors' minds a mathematical requirement, a ratio, or an amount that
must outweigh the opponent's evidence. "Clear and convincing" on the other
hand, is soley [sic] ends oriented. The law mentions nothing of a specific amount
of evidence required, but rather focuses on the feelings of the jury .... The
standard thus becomes subjective in orientation and focuses on quality rather than
quantity. Whether this will make any difference at all as a practical matter remains
to be seen.
Id. at 27.
9. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(d) (Supp. 1997) (providing for a bifurcated trial
whenever punitive damages have been requested); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(4) (Supp.
1997) (providing for a bifurcated trial at the request of any of the parties); TEX. Civ. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 41.009 (West 1997) (stating that a bifurcated trial would be provided
only on a motion by the defendant).
10. E.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-20(a) (1993) (requiring proof by clear and convincing evi-
dence); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(D)(2) (Anderson Supp. 1996) (same); see also
supra note 8.
11. E.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 43 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting) (advocating this approach as a constitutional requirement).
12. E.g., TEX. CIv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.011 (West 1997) (listing six relevant
factors to be used in determining exemplary damages); see also Fox & McConnico, supra
note 8, at 26, 35 (analyzing relevant evidence under this Texas statute).
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Still other reforms involve caps l ratios, 1 4 limits,15 new thresholds of
evidentiary sufficiency," or intensified scrutiny by trial and appellate
judges. 7  The 1996 Model Punitive Damages Act (Model Act) 1 adopts
several of these features, including an enhanced burden of proof, 9 a
tightened definition of gross negligence, 20 a nine-factor checklist for
dollar amounts,2' a requirement for bifurcation of trials in some
cases, 2 2 special review by the trial judge,23 and a hearing to reduce
awards that are "unfairly duplicative."2 4
The picture that emerges is that of a struggle in search of a
purpose. 25 For example, Ohio's 1996 reform legislation featured
26rigorous caps, and so did the federal tort reform bill of
13. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(g) (Supp. 1997) (setting a general cap of
$250,000); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-12-14-3 (Michie 1994) (setting a cap of $750,000 for both
actual and punitive damages in certain wrongful death cases).
14. E.g., NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42.005 (Michie 1996) (setting a cap of three times the
compensatory damages if such damages are more than $100,000, and setting a cap of
$300,000 if such damages are less than $100,000).
15. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Michie Supp. 1997) (setting a $350,000 limit on
medical malpractice punitive awards).
16. E.g., TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003 (West 1997.) (replacing gross neg-
ligence with higher thresholds).
17. E.g., id. § 41.013 (requiring justification "with specificity" when a punitive award is
upheld or overturned); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1991) (ap-
proving Alabama's approach of intensified judicial scrutiny).
18. MODEL PUNITrvE DAMAGES Acr (1996); see also Richard C. Reuben, This Model Sports
No Caps: Proposal by Uniform Law Commissioners Tightens Punitive Procedures, A.B.A. J., Oct.
1996, at 22, 22 (analyzing the Model Act and summarizing different commentators' posi-
tions on the punitive-damages debate).
19. MODEL PUNrnTvE DAMAGEs Acr § 5.
20. Id. § 5 cmt.
21. Id. § 7.
22. Id. § 11.
23. Id. § 8.
24. Id. § 10.
25. See Bruce Chapman & Michael Trebilcock, Punitive Damages: Divergence in Search of
a Rationale, 40 ALA. L. REv. 741, 761-826 (1989) (explaining rationales based on compensa-
tion, retribution, and deterrence); Andrea A. Curcio, Painful Publicity: An Alternative Puni-
tive Damage Sanction, 45 DEPAUL L. REv. 341, 346-51, 358-93 (1996) (describing rationales
and advocating publicity as an alternative to monetary punitive damages); David D. Had-
dock et al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1,
8-50 (1990) (distinguishing the authors' proposed bargaining-based model from illicit-
gains and court-error models); Sandra N. Hurd & Frances E. Zollers, State Punitive Damages
Statutes: A Proposed Alternative, 20J. LEGIS. 191, 195-203 (1994) (surveying a variety of stat-
utes and critiquing reform as "misguided"); David F. Partlett, Punitive Damages: Legal Hot
Zones, 56 LA. L. REv. 781, 792-802 (1996) (describing the "Search for a Rationale"); W. Lee
Pittman & Bert S. Nettles, Debate: What Is the Role or Function of Punitive Damages?, 24 CuMB.
L. REv. 453, 455-77 (1994) (debating differing rationales).
26. See OHiO REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(A)-(D) (Anderson 1996). The 1996 Ohio Act
provides a limit of the lesser of $100,000 or three times compensatory damages for busi-
nesses with fewer than twenty-five employees, and the lesser of $250,000 or three times
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1995.7 The Model Act, however, has no caps at all,2" and the drafters'
commentary refers to caps as "arbitrary."29 "There was no real contro-
versy on that, interestingly enough," reported one of the advisors to
the drafters.3" But the Model Act relies on other factors, such as jury
consideration of the defendant's wealth,31 which other commentators
have rejected. 2 The hefty debate means that continuing change is
likely.3" In summary, courts and legislatures lack a coherent vision of
the function they want punitive damages to serve, and therefore, they
have no clear goal toward which they can target these new standards.
compensatory damages for those with more than twenty-five employees. Id.; accord Ohio
Enacts Landmark Tort Reform Bill, THE ADVOCATE (Tex. Civ. Just. League), Dec. 1996, at 6
(explaining the Ohio Act).
27. See H.R. 10, 104th Cong. § 103(c) (1995) (proposing limiting punitive damages in
a product liability action to three times economic injury or $250,000, whichever is greater);
accord To Reform the Federal Civil Justice System; To Reform Product Liability Law: Hearing on
H.t 10 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 66 (1995) (statement of Richard
K. Willard, Esq., Steptoe & Johnson) (explaining the cap); Thornburgh, supra note 7, at
1085-86 (same). The President vetoed the bill, calling the cap "arbitrary." Nancy Mathis,
Clinton Vetoes Bill Limiting Suits over Defective Products, Hous. CHRON., May 3, 1996, at A2,
available in 1996 WL 5596310.
28. See supra note 18 and authorities therein cited.
29. MODEL PUNITIVE DAMAGES AcT prefatory note para. 20 (1996). President Clinton
made the same statement about the proposed cap in the federal bill, which he vetoed. See
supra note 27.
30. See Reuben, supra note 18, at 22.
31. MODEL PUNITIVE DAMAGES Acr § 7(a) (4) (listing as a factor "the defendant's pres-
ent and future financial condition and the effect of an award on each condition").
32. E.g., Chapman & Trebilcock, supra note 25, at 777-78, 801-04, 822-25 (concluding
that wealth should not be a factor under either the compensatory, retributive, or deter-
rence rationales). This Article is among those rejecting the wealth factor. See infra Part
III.B.1. Ironically, Alabama formerly excluded net-worth evidence as unduly prejudicial
but changed this approach after the Supreme Court in Haslip upheld, but exposed flaws in,
Alabama's system, which did not provide jury guidance on the factors considered by
judges. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19-24 (1991); Life Ins. Co. v.John-
son, 684 So. 2d 685, 688-702 (Ala.), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 288 (1996).
33. Thus, for example, a spokesperson for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America
(ATLA) criticized the Model Act on the ground that higher standards were not needed,
because "recent studies.., indicate that punitive damages are extremely rare and tend not
to be that high." Reuben, supra note 18, at 22. But a leading proponent of tort reform
criticized the same Model Act by arguing that the substitution of "a bunch of fluffy factors"
for a clearly defined cap was a denial of "[e]lementary due process." Id. Compare Thorn-
burgh, supra note 7, at 1085 (asserting that punitive damages are "now almost routinely
claimed in tort litigation") and STEVEN HAYwARD, THE ROLE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN CIVIL
LITIGATION: NEW EVIDENCE FROM LAWSUIT FILINGS 1, 4, 7-8 (Pacific Research Inst. for Pub.
Policy Briefing, Feb. 1996) (finding that "[p]unitive damages are demanded in 27 percent
of all cases where they are conceivably recoverable," and concluding that "[I]awsuits that
include punitive damage demands take one-third longer to resolve than suits without these
demands") with Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV.
1093, 1126-40 (1996) (analyzing surveys to conclude that punitive awards occur with "low
frequency" in personal injury and product liability cases but concluding from anecdotal
evidence that "the threat of punitive damages can be a significant factor in settlement").
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This Article attempts to find a unifying principle by undertaking
an economic analysis of tort remedies and applying it to the eviden-
tiary principles that determine punitive damages. The first Part of the
Article sets up an economic model of both compensatory and punitive
awards. Briefly put, this analysis shows that the core function of puni-
tive damages, at least where economically motivated actors are con-
cerned, 4 is to fill a gap in the deterrence of accident costs in a market
economy. This gap comes about because the externalization of acci-
dent costs is not fully addressed by compensatory damages, owing to
failures of detection, prosecution, proof, or remedy. Economic analy-
sis also shows that there is a theoretically appropriate level of deter-
rence, so that the tort system becomes dysfunctional if our legal rules
lead to the imposition of either too much punitive-damage liability or
too little.
Economic calculations, however, cannot properly form the exclu-
sive basis for analysis of punitive damages. Information deficiencies
sometimes mean that types of evidence theoretically correlated with
economic efficiency are inferior to other types of evidence that osten-
sibly seem less accurate. Furthermore, the consequentialist approach
that underlies economic reasoning may depart so severely from moral
considerations that the result is unacceptable in deontological terms.
The second Part of the Article therefore deals with these criticisms
and attempts a synthesis of economic analysis with the differing con-
cerns that the criticisms raise.
The third Part of the Article examines how the correct amount of
punitive damages is to be determined in a given case. Tort reform has
brought forth an array of different evidence rules, some of which,
when evaluated by an economic model, can be exposed as ill-suited to
the purpose. For example, although many jurisdictions" and the
Model Act 6 admit evidence about the defendant's net worth, an eco-
nomic analysis shows that this evidence actually has little relevance to
the proper function of punitive damages. Nor is net-worth evidence
34. The analysis in this Article applies principally to economically motivated actors. A
different problem arises in the event that injurers obtain socially illicit utility from the
infliction of loss itself, as in the case, say, of hate crimes, or the liability imposed by the civil
jury upon O.J. Simpson, or "[w] here, for instance, a man kicks his neighbor's dog because
he positively enjoys the unhappiness his neighbor will feel over it." STEVEN SHAVELL, EcO-
NOMIC ANALYSIs OF ACCIDENT LAw 147 (1987). In this event, the analysis is fundamentally
altered, because society does not value the basic activity in which the actor is engaged, or in
more technical terms, "we may not want to count the man's utility as an addition to social
welfare." Id. In such a case, liability may be more efficient if it exceeds the sum of all losses
by an amount great enough to remove all utility from the actor's conduct. Id.
35. See infra note 248 and accompanying text.
36. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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defensible in deontological terms. Indeed, this Article concludes that
net-worth evidence tends to divert the jury from more appropriate
considerations to such a degree that it should be excluded, pursuant
to Federal Rule of Evidence 403, 37 as excessively prejudicial or
misleading.
The goal, instead, should be the formulation of evidence rules
that guide juries toward computation of punitive awards that relate to
the deterrence gap, referred to above, and fall within a proportional
system of moral blameworthiness. The difficulty is that measuring this
gap is uncertain and complex in concrete cases-so much so, that an
insistence upon purity in economic theory would conflict with consid-
erations of clarity, predictability, and reasonable trial duration. The
final Part of the Article therefore contains the author's conclusions,
which include the concept that evidentiary standards should be
crafted so that punitive damages will serve their economic and moral
purposes, with the caution that perfect congruence between theory
and practice will be unattainable if the governing law is to allow for
efficient jury trials. Appropriate standards can be found in cases that
consider such factors as profitability of the wrongful conduct, actual
and expected harm, and "reprehensibility." Despite the apparent cru-
dity of these concepts, they are likely to provide better jury guidance
and more practical evidence than current standards or other theoreti-
cal constructs.
Before the analysis, it is necessary to distinguish several ancillary
issues that this Article does not consider in depth. First, it is possible
to argue that punitive damages do not and indeed cannot serve their
claimed economic function."8 The argument rests upon theoretical
assumptions such as perfect information as well as accurate and full
recoveries of all damages by all injured persons, and is therefore
37. FED. R. EVID. 403.
38. The argument posits that at any care level below the optimum due-care level, the
firm experiences incentives that force it to increase care. See infta fig.6. According to
Figure 6, the economic pressures on any firm operating with a combination of resources
that is to the left of point 0 (the due-care level) will force it toward point 0, without the
addition of punitive damages. A punitive award, by this argument, is superfluous. Cf Alan
Calnan, Ending the Punitive Damage Debate, 45 DEPAUL L. REv. 101, 109-22 (1995) (advocat-
ing the abolition of punitive damages in favor of restorative remedies for dignitary inju-
ries); Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 79, 79
(1982) (arguing that "[i]f fault is unintentional, then imposing punitive damages ... is
both unnecessary for deterrence and undeserved as punishment," although punitive dam-
ages may be justified for intentional wrongdoers or knowingly negligent conduct known to
be likely to injure). This reasoning arguably is incomplete, however. See infra Part I.B.
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treated here only in passing. 9 Second, this Article is concerned pri-
marily with behavior based upon economic exchange in recognizable
markets and therefore does not necessarily fit the actor who derives
perverse utility from breaking the law or gratuitously injuring others.4 °
Civil suits based upon hate crimes, vandalism, or the conduct for
which O.J. Simpson was found liable, therefore, would require adapta-
tion of this theory, although it probably could be fitted to the
purpose.4
Finally, there is the question whether an analysis of punitive dam-
ages really even matters. Some commentators suggest that punitive
awards are so rare that their effect, economic or otherwise, is of little
significance. Others disagree.4 2  In any event, it appears that in-
terjurisdictional differences are such that the issue is a cognizable
problem in some locations,4" and furthermore, that the punitive fac-
tor undoubtedly affects some of the vast majority of cases that settle.4 4
This Article therefore assumes that the issue is not without
significance.
39. See, e.g., John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance
with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REv. 965, 966, 994-97 (1984) (demonstrating that if all rele-
vant information is not perfectly known to actors, classical economic conclusions, presuma-
bly including those underlying punitive damages, may not hold, but asserting that damage
multipliers may be justified in some cases, if a degree of uncertainty is assumed); see also
infra Part II.A.
40. See supra note 34.
41. The adaptation would include a sufficient increase in the damage award to equal
the perverse enjoyment the actor experiences, thus eliminating the illicit utility. See supra
note 34.
42. See supra note 33 and authorities therein cited. Compare A. Mitchell Polinsky, Are
Punitive Damages Really Insignificant, Predictable, and Rational? A Comment on Eisenberg et al.,
26J. LEGAL STUD. 663 (1997) (critiquing conclusions about the rationality of punitive dam-
ages from empirical results while assuming results are correct) with Theodore Eisenberg et
al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26J. LEGAL STUD. 623 (1997) (reporting an ambi-
tious empirical study of punitive-damages judgments and attempting to draw conclusions,
which Polinsky's article critiques, about the rarity and size of punitive damages).
43. See Partlett, supra note 25, at 816-23 (summarizing punitive-damage studies and
showing that the problem varies geographically and topically); George L. Priest, Punitive
Damages Reform: The Case of Alabama, 56 LA. L. REv. 825, 825 (1996) (describing punitive
awards of such frequency and magnitude as to "dramatically affect the entire civil dispute
process" in that state). See generally STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CVIL JURIES AND
THE POUTICS OF REFORM (1995) (presenting evidence against the existence of a nationwide
problem but showing jurisdictional variations); HAYWARD, supra note 33 (demonstrating
demands for punitive damages in 27% of cases where conceivably recoverable and noting
extended length of suits demanding punitives).
44. See supra note 33 and authorities therein cited.
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I. THE ECONOMIC FUNCTION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
One possible model considers punitive damages as compensa-
tion.4 5 The theory is that injured plaintiffs do not recover certain
losses, such as the amounts they pay for attorneys' fees or the entre-
preneurship involved in bringing suit, and that punitive damages sup-
ply a corrective to the omission.4 6 Alternatively, punitive damages are
sometimes considered as a substitute for compensation in those in-
stances, such as defamation cases, where injury is apparent but diffi-
cult to value.47 This concept is better termed "presumed" damages, in
that it permits rough estimation of what really are compensatory
rather than punitive damages.4 8
In any event, the compensation rationale for punitive damages is
dubious,4 9 because normally it should be more economically efficient
to permit recovery of all losses by the best possible estimate, including
attorneys' fees if they are deemed items of loss, rather than by impos-
ing a penalty in excess of actual losses.5" This concept arguably is car-
ried out by recent statutes that divert part of punitive awards to the
state.5 1 The better rationale is not compensation but deterrence. The
economist would explain that what is important is that the defendant
pays an appropriate level of punitive damages, not that the plaintiff
receives them.
45. See Chapman & Trebilcock, supra note 25, at 761-78 (analyzing the compensation
rationale).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 763 (analyzing punitive damages in the context of dignitary torts, which the
authors say might better be termed "aggravated" damages because they are not really
punitive).
48. See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
49. See Chapman & Trebilcock, supra note 25, at 763 (critiquing the rationale on the
ground that it fails to explain why a higher degree of fault should be required for punitive
damages than that required for compensation for actual losses, except in cases such as
malicious injury to dignity, where the compensation is for "aggravated," rather than puni-
tive, damages).
50. See id. (suggesting that the result is a "windfall" rather than compensation); see also
infra Part I.B.2. (describing the economic inefficiency of excessive punitive damages).
51. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2)(a)-(b) (West 1997) (requiring that 35% of the
punitive-damages award be paid to a medical assistance trust fund, if the action was based
on personal injury or wrongful death, or to state general revenue, if it is another type of
action); Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.675 (1997) (requiring, after the deduction of attorneys' fees
and expenses, that 50% of the punitive award be contributed to a tort victim compensation
fund); OR. REv. STAT. § 18.540 (1988) (requiring that one-half of the punitive-damages
award be paid to the criminal injuries compensation fund).
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A. A Summary: Punitive Damages and Economic Theory
To an economist, the most important aspect of the price system is
the way in which it works to allocate resources. 52 Money has no intrin-
sic worth,5 3 whether it comes in the form of payments for purchases,
compensatory damages, or for that matter, punitive damages. In-
stead, the costs of various resources that a firm uses to provide a prod-
uct or service are an inducement to economic efficiency. The price
system forces the firm to produce in the most efficient manner possi-
ble, and it also induces the firm to provide those products or services
that the consumers of a society want.54 For the most part, the market
functions in this manner independently of the tort system, but tort
remedies cannot be understood except in the context of the market
system.5
1. Compensatory Damages as Economic Deterrents.-Against this
background, the function of compensatory damages can be seen as
that of addressing market imperfections.5 6 The theory of market effi-
ciency breaks down if the firm can avoid costs by "externalizing"
them.5 7 If cheaper means of production result in environmental pol-
lution or in an unacceptably large proportion of accidents and inju-
ries, for example, the price system counterproductively forces firms to
chose this privately-desirable-but-socially-dysfunctional method of pro-
duction. The economist would see the imposition of damage liability
as a corrective to these externalities. 58 The desirable level of damage
liability would be reached when it precisely balanced the consumers'
desire for readily available products against the desire to avoid the
52. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WLLIAM D. NoRDHAus, ECONOMICS 741-54 (13th ed.
1989) (discussing markets and economic efficiency); MARY, SEIDENFELD, MICROECONOMIC
PREDICATES TO LAw AND ECONOMICS 21-60 (1996) (discussing producer decisionmaking,
market dynamics, and efficiency); see also A. MITCHELL POLINSKY & STEVEN SHAVELL, PUNI-
TIVE DAMAGES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS pt. II (John M. Olin Cent. for Law, Econ. and Bus.
Discussion Paper No. 212, 1997) (forthcoming 111 HARv. L. REV. (1998)) (presenting a
general economic theory and applying it to punitive damages).
53. SAMUELSON & NoRDIAUs, supra note 52, at 226-27.
54. See supra note 52 and authorities therein cited.
55. See SAMUELSON & NoRDHAus, supra note 52, at 773-75 (discussing market imperfec-
tions and regulatory or liability responses to them); cf SEIDENFELD, supra note 52, at 61
(discussing market imperfections).
56. See supra note 55 and authorities therein cited.
57. "Externalizing" costs refers to the reduction of one's own production costs by
methods that impose costs or losses upon other firms or individuals. See SAMUELSON &
NoRDHAus, supra note 52, at 972 (defining "externality" as "[a]n activity that affects others
for better or worse, without those others paying or being compensated for the activity"); see
also id. at 773-75 (discussing market imperfections and regulatory responses to them).
58. See supra note 55 and authorities therein cited.
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harmful consequences, such as pollution or injuries, that result from
cheap production.59 In this view, deviations from the optimal level of
damage liability are undesirable, irrespective of whether they are up-
ward or downward. Too much damage liability results in an undesir-
able suppression of the production of goods or services; too little
results in undesirably high levels of external effects. 60
Usually, the tort system provides the requisite deterrence through
compensation to the plaintiff.6 ' This compensatory orientation, how-
ever, obscures the economic function of damage remedies. Although
compensation is the measure the courts have adopted, and it obvi-
ously is the most important aspect of the remedy to individual plain-
tiffs, the more significant aspect of compensatory damages to an
economist is the deterrence of the defendant that results from the
defendant's having to add the amount of potential damage verdicts to
its production costs.62 If these damages are correctly computed, they
precisely measure the degree to which society values the corrective, or
deterrent, that it chooses to administer.63 The theory requires that
the compensation be complete, including all of the costs or losses suf-
fered by the plaintiff, whether explicitly monetary or not, and whether
readily measurable or not.' If this level is reached, the tort system
provides exactly the level of deterrence that is socially desirable.65
59. See RJcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 191-92 (3d ed. 1992) (discuss-
ing reasons why damages should be equal to, but limited to, the amount of the loss); POLIN-
SKY & SHAVELL, supra note 52, at pt. II.A (same).
60. See POSNER, supra note 59, at 191-92. It has been argued that the direct health-care
costs of job-related injuries and illnesses are far greater than has been realized. SeeJ. Paul
Leigh et al., Occupational Injury and Illness in the United States: Estimates of Costs, Morbidity,
and Mortality, 157 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1557, 1557 (1997) (concluding that
"[o]ccupational injuries and illnesses are an insufficiently appreciated contributor to the
total burden of health care costs in the United States"). Personal losses to the injured
workers and economic losses for their employers add to these costs. This consideration
arguably supports greater deterrence of accident-producing behavior.
61. See infra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
62. See POSNER, supra note 59, at 191 (noting that the real point is that the defendant
should pay damages equaling the loss, that the remaining issue is whether they should be
paid to the injured person rather than the state, and that the reasons for compensating the
plaintiff are, first, to maintain an incentive for injured persons to sue, and second, to avoid
overspending on precautions by potential victims); see also A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo
Che, Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation, 22 RAND J. ECON. 562,
563 (1991) (arguing that the amount received by the plaintiff need not and in some in-
stances should not be the same as that paid by the defendant).
63. Cf POSNER, supra note 59, at 164 (discussing the importance of weighing the costs
and benefits of accident prevention when determining the optimal level of liability).
64. See id. at 196-201 (illustrating losses in efficiency that result when damages fail to
include the value of some kinds of harm, such as hedonic injuries, and demonstrating the
difficulty, yet importance, of correct valuation).
65. See id.
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Sometimes the courts expressly have analyzed this relationship
between the compensation standard and the deterrence function.
For example, in Memphis Community School District v. Stachura,66 the
Supreme Court reviewed a damage verdict under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
based upon the First Amendment claims of an allegedly wrongfully
suspended public school teacher.67 The district court instructed the
jury to award the plaintiff (1) compensatory damages, plus (2) puni-
tive damages, plus (3) an amount of additional damages based upon
the value or importance of the abstract constitutional right that the
defendant allegedly violated.68 Specifically, the district court stated:
"The precise value you place upon any Constitutional right
which you find was denied to Plaintiff is within your discre-
tion. You may wish to consider the importance of the right
in our system of government, the role which this right has
played in the history of our republic, [and] the significance
of the right in the context of the activities which the Plaintiff
was engaged in at the time of the violation of the right."69
The district court entered a large judgment based upon a jury verdict
that included this supplementary element.7° The court of appeals af-
firmed.7' Owing to the fundamental importance of the right at issue,
these lower courts evidently concluded that a dollop of extra deter-
rence was required in addition to compensatory and punitive
damages.
The Supreme Court reversed, expressly tying the function of
compensatory damages (provided that all losses were fully compen-
sated) to the deterrence purpose:
Punitive damages aside, damages in tort cases are
designed to provide "compensation for the injury caused to
plaintiff by defendant's breach of duty." To that end, com-
pensatory damages may include not only out-of-pocket loss
and other monetary harms, but also such injuries as "impair-
ment of reputation .... personal humiliation, and mental
66. 477 U.S. 299 (1986).
67. Id. at 301-02. Section 1983 creates a private cause of action in favor of individuals
who are deprived of their constitutional rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994); accord
Stachura, 477 U.S. at 305-06. The relevant portion of the First Amendment provides: "Con-
gress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I; accord
Stachura, 477 U.S. at 301-02.
68. Stachura, 477 U.S. at 305.
69. Id. at 303 (alteration in original) (quoting the jury instructions of the district
court).
70. Id.
71. Id.
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anguish and suffering." Deterrence is also an important pur-
pose of this system, but it operates through the mechanism
of damages that are compensatory--damages grounded in de-
terminations of plaintiffs' actual losses.72
The Court refused to allow the challenged instructions to authorize a
form of "presumed" damages, a traditional remedy when no realistic
measure of damages can be found.73 Presumed damages, said the
Court, "are a substitute for ordinary compensatory damages, not a sup-
plement for an award that fully compensates the alleged injury. 71
Here, "no rough substitute for compensatory damages was required
... since the jury was fully authorized to compensate [plaintiffs] for
both monetary and nonmonetary harms caused by [defendant's]
conduct.""
In Stachura, the proper level of deterrence was approximated by
compensatory damages, which provided a level of deterrence consis-
tent with society's valuation of avoidance of the harm in question.76
Excessive deterrence, such as that which would have resulted from the
district court's gratuitous addition of a supplement to protect the ab-
stract right in question, would have been dysfunctional. It would have
caused school districts to become excessively risk-averse, motivating
them to tilt the balance toward retention of incompetent teachers and
disruptive students.77 The Supreme Court's reversal was correct, and
its analysis of the function of compensatory damages was sound.
2. Punitive Damages as Gap-Fillers in the System of Economic Deter-
rence.-The economist would see complete compensatory damages, at
least in theory, as fulfilling this function of deterring accident cost
externalization. 78 The price system, in this view, induces the firm to
produce goods and services efficiently, while the tort reparations sys-
tem confronts the firm with the precise cost of losses to victims in the
form of compensatory damages. 79 But the compensation-based the-
ory is accurate only if every tort victim recovers fully for all losses.8"
Perhaps for this reason, the modern law of remedies avoids the pejo-
72. Id. at 306-07 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting 2 F. HARPER ET
AL., LAW OF TORTS § 25.1, at 490 (2d ed. 1986) and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 350 (1974)).
73. Id. at 310.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 312.
76. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
77. Cf supra note 60 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
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rative labeling of uncertain damages as "speculative" or "guesswork,"
and it tends to accept imperfect modeling as a substitute for exact
calculation. As one court of appeals has said, "[C]ompensation for
undisputed injury should not be denied merely because the amount
of damages cannot be precisely and exactly determined."81
Even with this corrective, however, the theory of deterrence
through compensation breaks down. All victims still will not always
recover their full losses. Transaction costs (such as attorneys' or ex-
perts' fees) and proof difficulties are such that not all injured persons
will sue for, let alone recover, exactly what they have lost.82 It is for
this reason that punitive damages are useful. The economic function
of these damages, according to this argument, is not so much that of
"punishing" an individual based upon "wrongful intent" as that of ad-
justing the level and locus of damage liability to take account of un-
dervaluation of external costs by the tort system through
compensatory damages alone.83
At the same time, there is a need to limit punitive damages. Eco-
nomic theory suggests that they can be harmful rather than helpful, if
they are imposed in excessive amounts.84 Therefore, there is a need
to restrict their availability to cases in which compensatory damages
are an insufficient deterrent and to compute their amounts so that
they fit their respective deterrence gaps. The economist would see a
threshold requirement of gross negligence, for example, as a means
of limiting the availability of punitive damages to cases of underdeter-
rence. 85 A more economically precise measurement would inquire
81. Hawthorne Indus. v. Balfour MacLaine Int'l, Ltd., 676 F.2d 1385, 1388 (11th Cir.
1982) (construing U.C.C. § 2-715 cmt. 4 (1977), which rejects any requirement of mathe-
matical precision and allows "any manner which is reasonable under the circumstances").
82. See DAVID CRUMP ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 1041-42 (2d ed.
1992) (illustrating the difficulty for injured persons to recover losses that are not easy to
prove or to value); cf POSNER, supra note 59, at 220 (comparing punitive damages and
penal sanctions that exceed losses because of factors such as failures of detection and trans-
action costs); SHAVELL, supra note 34, at 146-51 (discussing reasons for imposing liability in
excess of loss).
This analysis applies principally to economically motivated actors. When the
tortfeasor derives illicit utility from the tort, as in the case of a hate crime, the analysis must
be adjusted to eliminate this utility. See supra note 34.
83. See POLINSKY & SHAVELL, supra note 52, at 8-9 ("In summary, punitive damages should
ordinarily be awarded if but only if, an injurer has a chance of escaping liability for the harm he
caused,"); see also infra text accompanying notes 100-102 (describing economic reasoning by
the majority and the dissent in a Supreme Court opinion in which the standard of fault is
discussed as a means of influencing actors to optimize their prevention of harm rather
than in terms of wrongfulness).
84. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 82 and authorities therein cited.
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about the deterrent adequacy of actual damages.8 6 Thus, the gross
negligence threshold is a crude yardstick. Nevertheless, it approxi-
mates this function.87 If a state government were to determine that
this standard did not properly calibrate the desired reduction in inju-
ries with the desired level of production of goods and services, the
economist might advise shifting to a different standard. For example,
the economist might require a showing of intentional injury if puni-
tive damages were too high,88 or an automatic doubling or trebling of
compensatory damages based on simple proof of liability (as in anti-
trust cases) if they were too low. 89 In addition, various means of meas-
uring the proper amount of punitive damages have evolved in the law,
such as requiring proportional relationships to actual damages (or im-
posing absolute limits, as some states have done)."°
Again, the courts sometimes have referred expressly to the deter-
rent function of punitive damages in economic terms. For example,
in Smith v. Wade,91 the Supreme Court considered a 42 U.S.C. § 1983
suit against Smith, a prison guard, for having placed in Wade's cell
two other inmates who beat and sexually assaulted him.9 2 Wade vol-
untarily sought administrative segregation because of prior assaults,
and a vacant cell was available.93 He alleged that Smith violated the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment
because the guard knew or should have known that assault was
likely.94 The trial court instructed the jury that Smith could be liable
for compensatory damages only if he acted with gross negligence, "de-
fined as 'a callous indifference or a thoughtless disregard for the con-
sequences of one's act or failure to act."' 95 Smith thus could not be
86. This is so, because if actual damages provide all the deterrence necessary, there is
no economic reason for greater damages. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
87. Cf POSNER, supra note 59, at 209-10 (justifying punitive damages in cases of indiffer-
ence by the tortfeasor because of a probable correlation between this factor and the deter-
rence gap).
88. Cf infta notes 91-102 and accompanying text (discussing a Supreme Court opinion
that approved of a standard for assessing punitive damages that required a showing of
"gross negligence" but not of actual intent).
89. See POSNER, supra note 59, at 315-16 (discussing the computation of antitrust
damages).
90. See supra notes 9-28 and accompanying text.
91. 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
92. Id. at 32, 34-35; see also supra note 67 (explaining actions arising under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1994)).
93. Smith, 461 U.S. at 32.
94. Id. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII (emphasis added).
95. Smith, 461 U.S. at 33 (quoting the trial judge's jury instructions).
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liable even for compensatory damages on a finding of only simple
negligence.96 The trial judge also instructed the jury on punitive dam-
ages in a way that required no greater culpability than that required
for compensatories:
"[I] f the conduct of one or more of the defendants is shown
to be a reckless or callous disregard of, or indifference to,
the rights or safety of others, then you may assess punitive or
exemplary damages in addition to any award of actual
damages.
".... The amount of punitive or exemplary damages as-
sessed against any defendant may be such sum as you believe
will serve to punish that defendant and to deter him and
others from like conduct.
9 7
After the jury found Smith liable and awarded $25,000 in compensa-
tory and $5000 in punitive damages, the Supreme Court affirmed a
judgment based upon these instructions.98
Smith argued that the punitive award should be reversed because
the instruction should have limited punitive damages to situations in-
volving "'ill will, spite, or intent to injure."'99 The Supreme Court
rejected this argument:
Smith's argument... is that an actual-intent standard is
preferable to a recklessness standard because it is less
vague.... He concedes, of course, that deterrence of future
egregious conduct is a primary purpose of both § 1983 and
of punitive damages. But deterrence, he contends, cannot
be achieved unless the standard of conduct sought to be de-
terred is stated with sufficient clarity to enable potential de-
fendants to conform to the law and to avoid the proposed
sanction.
... The need for exceptional clarity in the standard for
punitive damages arises only if one assumes that there are
substantial numbers of officers who will not be deterred by
compensatory damages; only such officers will seek to guide
their conduct by the punitive damages standard. The pres-
ence of such officers constitutes a powerful argument against
raising the threshold for punitive damages.10 0
96. Id.
97. Id. (quoting the trial judge's jury instructions) (emphasis omitted).
98. Id. at 33, 56.
99. Id. at 37 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 9).
100. Id. at 49-50 (citations omitted).
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This reasoning, although it does correctly characterize the deterrence
function, is flawed. All corrections officers now will need to trim their
performance to avoid the prospect of vague punitive-damage liabil-
ity. 101 This liability can be inappropriately overimposed just as it can
be underimposed, and it can be imposed even upon officers who be-
lieve they are acting reasonably, if a jury later disagrees. Thus, in his
dissent, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Powell, pointed out that "the uncertainty resulting from largely ran-
dom awards of punitive damages will have serious effects upon the
performance by state and local officers of their official duties."102
Despite this disagreement, the Justices seem to have correctly un-
derstood the basic economic purpose of punitive damages. 10 3 The
majority properly made the choice of a threshold dependent not on
anything inherent in formalisms such as "intent" or "spite," but rather
on the use of these labels to communicate the optimal level of deter-
rence. The dissent-which seems to have had the better understand-
ing of the indifference of economic deterrents to purity of heart-
accepts the deterrence principle, but it argues that the level chosen by
the majority will result in overkill.
B. Developing the Economic Theory from Basic Principles
1. Adjusting the Defendant's Cost Curves Through Tort Remedies.-
The economic theory sketched above can best be developed by an
examination of short-term marginal cost curves. Marginal cost is the
cost associated with each additional unit of output.'0 4 In the short
run, marginal cost increases with high levels of output, as expensive
factors of production are pressed into service; the firm pays overtime
to workers, uses worn machinery, and buys expensive materials from
less efficient firms on the fringe.'0 5 Therefore, the marginal cost
curve slopes upward.'0 6 Figure 1 shows a private firm's marginal cost
101. Cf SHAVELL, supra note 34, at 79-83 (explaining the effects of uncertainty); see also
infra Part II.A.2-3 (discussing irrationality and uncertainty).
102. Smith, 461 U.S. at 88 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
103. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
104. SAMUELSON & NoIRHAus, supra note 52, at 514 (explaining that marginal cost "de-
notes the extra or additional cost of producing [one] extra unit of output").
105. See id. at 514-15 (discussing the calculation of marginal cost).
106. Id. Actually, the marginal cost curve is U-shaped when considered as a whole, be-
cause at low output the cost of each unit is high, reflecting scale economics. Id. The
marginal cost curve slopes upward, however, at the point where it intersects the average
cost curve at the point of lowest average cost. Id. This represents efficient production. See
id. at 515-20 (discussing the relationship between cost and production).
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curve (indicated by the dotted line), when the producer is not moti-
vated to consider externalized accident costs.'
0 7
P
(price of each
additional unit)
Figure 1
Q (quantity produced)
In such a situation, the society wishes that the producer actually
would use a more expensive method of production, one that does not
externalize such losses as those caused by accidents.108 Therefore, the
socially desirable level of production cost is higher, even though this
cost means higher product cost to the consumer.1"9 The social margi-
nal cost curve (indicated by the solid line) is shaped somewhat like
the private firm's marginal cost curve, but it reflects a higher level of
dollar cost per unit of production. The cost level is higher because it
includes safety-related behaviors that reduce accidents. Thus, Figure
107. See infra fig.1. This figure is adapted from POSNER, supra note 59, at 176-77 fig.6.2.
108. See POSNER, supra note 59, at 180-81 (discussing a consumer's willingness to pay
more for a safer product in terms of a balancing of possible accident costs against the costs
of a safer product).
109. See id.
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1 shows the social marginal cost curve, which incorporates the optimal
level of safety expense, at a higher cost level than the private firm's
marginal cost curve. The difference between the curves is the level of
underdeterrence, or the degree to which the producer will exter-
nalize. The producer's lack of motivation to consider accident costs
results in this amount of shortfall in safety expenditures from an opti-
mal level.
The economic goal of the tort system, then, is quite simple: to
force the producer to internalize accident costs by shifting the firm's
cost curve. In general, the law targets this goal through actual, com-
pensatory damages, as we saw in the preceding subpart of this Arti-
cle."' Inevitably, however, there is a gap in deterrence, which may be
small or large, caused by failures in detection, prosecution, proof, or
remedy."' Figure 2 illustrates this set of circumstances." 2 The firm's
private marginal cost curve (dotted line) again is below the social mar-
ginal cost curve (solid line). The imposition of actual damage liabil-
ity, however, causes the firm to shift its marginal cost curve upward,
because the firm is motivated to make expenditures for safety features
by the possibility that the courts may force it to compensate accident
victims."' The shifted marginal cost curve (dashed line) is not so-
cially optimal, however, because the failure of all accident victims to
recover their costs fully results in a level of underdeterrence, as is
indicated.
Figure 3 illustrates the way in which punitive damages may force
the proper shift." 4 In the absence of a tort system, the producer
110. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
112. See infra fig.2. This figure, like Figure 1, is adapted from POSNER, supra note 59, at
176-77 fig.6.2, with the addition of the deterrence gap.
113. It should be added that a shifted demand curve for the consumer is an alternative
possibility. See SHAVELL, supra note 34, at 52 (explaining that potential customers would go
elsewhere if a firm were to take less than optimal care). That is to say, if the producer
externalizes injuries, the consumer responds by exhibiting a demand curve that is lower
than the demand curve for a safer product. Id. If information is good, the consumer may
take precautions such as selecting a safer product, purchasing ancillary equipment that
reduces risk, and using additional care in connection with the product. See A. MITCHELL
POLINSKY, AN INTRODucrION TO LAw AND ECONOMICS chs. 9, 13 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing
the allocation -of risk between an injurer and a victim, and describing the effect of an
informed consumer on the allocation of risk). Additional care by the consumer may be
more efficient than additional care by the producer, and there is a theoretically optimal
mix of care by both. See id. Efficiency of consumer care, however, is impaired by informa-
tional deficiencies. See SHAVELL, supra note 34, at 53 (describing the impact of imperfect
customer knowledge on the care taken by the customer).
114. See infra fig.3. Once again, this figure is adapted from POSNER, supra note 59, at
176-77 fig.6.2. The concept of punitive damages as a gap-filler is added. See generally Keith
N. Hylton, A Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 977 (1996) (explaining
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would confront only the private cost of producing the product
(dotted line), without incurring any safety expense. The social margi-
nal cost curve (solid line) incorporates the level of safety expenditures
that the society desires. The goal of deterrence is to force the pro-
ducer to consider external accident costs by incorporating a proper
level of safety expense, a level at which the shifted cost curve would
approach the social curve. The firm's shifted marginal cost curve
(dashed line) now includes expenses for safety features induced by
the combination of compensatory and punitive damages. This combi-
nation of compensation with optimal punitive damages, measured to
fit the deterrence gap, forces the firm to produce with the socially
desired mix of safety and non-safety expenses.
In summary, there is an economically optimal level for punitive
damages. This optimal level is reached, the economist would say,
when the fully shifted private marginal cost curve becomes identical to
tort law with reference to the incompleteness of markets as allocators of risks); Jason S.
Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficiency in Tort Law, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1385
(1987) (describing a theory of optimal punitive liability based upon the redressing of defi-
cient damages due to uncertainty in recovery).
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the social marginal cost curve. At this level, the firm is producing with
precisely the mix of efficient production expense plus safety expense
that represents the society's desired allocation of goods and services.
The combination of punitive and compensatory damages, at this level,
forces firms to reduce their externalization of accident costs by spend-
ing the optimal amount on accident prevention.
2. The Economic Limits: Costs, Benefits, Supply, and Demand.--Pu-
nitive damages are difficult to value, however, and therefore, they are
difficult to keep in check."1 5 One reason is that cost curves of this
kind are exceedingly difficult to derive empirically. 1 6 Therefore,
levels of underdeterrence are difficult to measure. Furthermore,
there is a natural tendency to assume that if one dollar of accident-
prevention expense is a good idea, two dollars are twice as good; con-
115. See CRUMP ET AL., supra note 82, at 1024.
116. See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 52, at 9-10, 595-602 (discussing the roles of
risk and uncertainty in economics).
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sequently, there is a human urge to exaggerate the punitive award
with the idea of perfectly deterring accidents. A decisionmaker in the
form of a judge or juror may reason (erroneously) that the proper
level of punitive damages is "whatever level is necessary to make these
companies stop this behavior"-i.e., to stamp out the offending behav-
ior completely."
17
This situation is depicted in Figure 4.118 Again, the cost curve of
the private firm externalizing accident costs (dotted line) is below the
social marginal cost curve (solid line). In this case, the imposition of a
large punitive-damage liability actually shifts the private marginal cost
curve (dashed line) above the social curve. These circumstances re-
sult in a level of punitive-damage "overkill," represented by the differ-
ence between these two curves.' 19
The disadvantages of this overkill are illustrated in Figure 5.12° In
an atomistically competitive market, 12 1 the firm's supply curve is iden-
tical to its marginal cost curve. 122 Figure 5 therefore labels the margi-
nal cost curves as supply curves and couples them with a demand
curve. The supply curves are sloped upward, because producers are
eager to produce greater quantities when price increases; the demand
curve, on the other hand, slopes downward, because consumers are
willing to purchase greater quantities when price decreases. 123 The
intersection of the supply and demand curves is the market price.1
24
Higher prices bring about a disequilibrium in which sellers wish to
117. Cf infra note 268 and accompanying text (illustrating popular attitudes toward pu-
nitive awards imposed on economic actors).
118. See infra fig.4. This figure is adapted from POSNER, supra note 59, at 176-77 fig.6.2,
with the addition of overdeterrence considerations. See id. at 224-25.
119. See SHAvE, supra note 34, ch. 6 (discussing the optimal level of liability and the
results of overdeterrence).
120. See infra fig.5. This figure is adapted from POSNER, supra note 59, at 176-77 fig.6.2,
with the addition of overdeterrence considerations.
121. "Atomistic competition," also called "perfect competition," refers to a market in
which the number of sellers is so large that none can exert any individual influence on
price (i.e., each firm occupies an atomistically small market share), and the product is
undifferentiated, homogeneous, and generic (i.e., brand differentiation does not permit
price fluctuation). See SAMUELSON & NoRDHAus, supra note 52, at 968 (defining perfect
and imperfect competition). Theories of competitive efficiency typically are fashioned for
atomistically or perfectly competitive markets on the one hand, or for oligopoly or monop-
oly on the other. See id.
122. This is so in that portion of the marginal cost curve where marginal cost is rising.
Cf supra note 106 and accompanying text (explaining the slope of the marginal cost
curve). This is the area where the firm is efficient, which it must be in a competitive
market. See SAMUELSON & NoaHAus, supra note 52, at 542-43 (discussing the derivation of
supply curves from marginal cost curves).
123. See SEInENFELD, supra note 52, at 36-37.
124. See SAMUELSON & NoR.DHAus, supra note 52, at 557.
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enter the market, while buyers wish to exit; a lower price results in an
undersupply, with consumers demanding more units than sellers are
willing to furnish. 1 15  The market price. allocates resources effi-
ciently, 12 ' as a general proposition, 1 2 7 because it correctly matches
consumption to output.'28
Once again, the dotted line represents the firm's supply curve
when the firm externalizes accident Costs.'22' This would be the supply
curve if there were no tort system and no prospect of damage liability.
In such circumstances, producers are willing to supply great quantities
at low prices, but there is a catch: They cause a socially unacceptable
125. See id.
126. See id. at 741-54 (discussing markets and economic efficiency).
127. See id. This generalization is subject to exceptions, when equilibrium either is not
efficient or is not reached (as by cobweb-type divergence). Cf. id. at 557-64 (describing
markets with peculiar dynamics).
128. See id, at 742-45 (discussing markets and economic efficiency).
129. Cf. supra fig.1 (illustrating private supply curve as compared to social cost curve).
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number of accidents."' The higher-level supply curve (solid line) is
the social supply curve, reflecting optimal safety expense. The supply
curve affected by punitive-damage overkill (dashed line) represents
the supply curve that will result if firms are affected by an excess of
punitive liability.
When firms face this sort of punitive-damage overkill, the tort sys-
tem sends dysfunctional messages to producers. As a result, the mar-
ket price is higher, and output is lower, as Figure 5 shows.' 3 1
Consumers find that their purchases are more difficult and more ex-
pensive to complete, even in the case of crucially necessary products.
If we apply an excess of punitive damages to producers of life-saving
medicines, ambulance manufacturers, or health-care providers, for ex-
ample, we may find that we have both restricted the output of these
goods and services and priced them out of the reach of some consum-
130. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
131. See supra fig.5; cf SEIDENFELD, supra note 52, at 44-46 (discussing the effects of gov-
ernment intervention on pricing). Although Seidenfeld's examples concern the imposi-
tion of taxes and price caps, the analysis would be similar for a dysfunctional cost, such as
an excessive amount of punitive damages, imposed by government.
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ers. 32 The judge or juror who wants to impose crushing punitive lia-
bility, so as to "stop" accidents completely, may be acting with the best
of intentions and may be following natural human urges, but the eco-
nomic result of this choice can be disastrous shortages of essential
commodities.
C. Economics and Tort Law: Finding the Proper Occasions for
Deterrence-and the Right Level
It should not seem peculiar that this analysis of punitive damages
is done in economic terms. Economic analysis of tort law is a useful
aid to its proper development, from age-old problems of trespass to
modem issues of product liability. Even when the reasoning of the
common-law courts has been ruthlessly formalistic, the results almost
always have made sense in economic terms. 3' The economic goal,
and usually the approximate result of the common law, is to adminis-
ter the deterrent effect of a damage remedy in the appropriate cir-
cumstances and at roughly the proper level."' This level of
deterrence is that at which the last dollar spent on accident preven-
tion exactly equals the loss in manufacturing value that it causes, so
that greater expenditures will cost more than they are worth.135
Occasionally, common-law judges have used explicit formulae
that recognize this economic goal. Perhaps the most famous case is
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 136 in which Judge Learned Hand
explained the basic negligence calculus."3 7 There, the issue was
132. Cf SEIDENFELD, supra note 52, at 46 & fig.27 (illustrating shortages resulting from a
price cap). See generally THOMAS J. CAMPBELL ET AL., THE CAUSES AND EFFECTS O LIABILIT
REFORM: SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper
No. 4989, 1995) (showing that states that reduced liability through tort reform exper-
ienced increases in measured productivity and employment); GENERAL AVIATION MANUFAC-
TURERS ASS'N, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: THE RESULTS OF THE GENERAL
AVIATION REVITALIZATION ACT (1996) (describing the increase in production and employ-
ment resulting from the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101-
40120 (1994)). In libel cases, it appears that punitive damages disproportionately discour-
age political speech, unpopular viewpoints, and minority speakers. See Nicole B. Cfisarez,
Punitive Damages in Defamation Actions: An Area of Libel Law Worth Reforming, 32 DuQ. L. REV.
667, 682-88 (1994) (discussing the chilling effect of punitive damages on protected speech
and the use of punitive damages to punish unpopular viewpoints and speakers).
133. See POSNER, supra note 59, at 23 (pointing out that although judicial opinions of
common-law courts rarely make explicit reference to economics, they often "bear the
stamp of economic reasoning").
134. Cf id. (characterizing the economic goal of the common-law system as the max-
imization of society's wealth).
135. See id. at 163-67 (discussing the economics of accidents).
136. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
137. See id. at 173; see also POSNER, supra note 59, at 163-67 (explaining the Learned
Hand formula). Judge Posner also demonstrated that the formula underlies other deci-
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whether a barge owner was negligent in failing to have an attendant
on board while the barge was being towed, in case she broke away.138
Judge Hand's analysis was "a function of three variables: (1) [t]he
probability that she will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting
injury, if she does; [and] (3) the burden of adequate precautions. "139
Judge Hand observed that it might help to state the formula in alge-
braic terms, and he proceeded to do so: "[I]f the probability be called
P, the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B
is less than L multiplied by P. i.e., whether B < PL."
Stated as an equation in modern mathematical notation, Judge
Hand's formula means that negligence liability begins to appear at the
point where B < PL. This is an economic formula. Judge Posner ex-
plains the significance of Judge Hand's reasoning as follows:
If the cost of safety measures ... exceeds the benefit in acci-
dent avoidance to be gained by incurring that cost, society
would be better off, in economic terms, to forgo accident
prevention.... [O]verall economic value or welfare would
be diminished rather than increased by incurring a higher
accident-prevention cost in order to avoid a lower accident
cost. If, on the other hand, the benefits in accident avoid-
ance exceed the costs of prevention, society is better off if
those costs are incurred and the accident averted, and so in
this case the enterprise is made liable, in the expectation
that self-interest will lead it to adopt the precautions in order
to avoid a greater cost in tort judgments. 4 '
Graphically, this reasoning can be illustrated by a diagram such as Fig-
ure 6.142 The burden, B (or cost due to accident prevention ex-
penses) increases as the degree of care, or the amount of money spent
on safety, increases. Therefore the line representing B slopes upward.
The probable cost due to losses from accidents, or the probability of
an accident multiplied by the likely amount of the loss (P x L), pro-
duces the downward-sloping line PL, because the value of these losses
sions, such as Adams v. Bullock, 125 N.E. 93, 93 (N.Y. 1919), which held that because of the
relation of burden, probability, and damages, the defendant was not liable for injuries to a
boy who touched a trolley wire with a metal cable, and Hendricks v. Peabody Coal Co., 253
N.E.2d 56, 60-61 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969), which imposed damages because the cost or the
burden was slight as compared to the risk. POSNER, supra note 59, at 166-67.
138. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 171.
139. Id. at 173.
140. Id. (emphasis added).
141. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STun. 29, 32-33 (1972).
142. See infra fig.6. This figure is adapted from POSNER, supra note 59, at 164-65 fig.6.1.
It is modified in some respects, such as by the addition of features that illustrate
overdeterrence.
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declines as the degree of care increases. The intersection of the two
curves, where B = PL, is the optimal level of care, or "due care." At
lesser degrees of care, the tort system threatens the producer with
negligence liability, thereby inducing greater social efficiency through
negligence liability for damages.' 43 At greater degrees of care, the
producer wastefully invests safety expenses that cost more than they
are worth in accident reduction. 144 Here, the market system will in-
duce efficiency.
-
4BX
dollar
cost Bo= PL "
"PLx
due
care
tort system induces market
efficiency - -*-system--
induces
negligence efficiency
Figure 6 x
degree of care
Figure 6 allows us to illustrate the effect of excess liability. At
safety level X for example, the expense attributable to the degree of
care is disproportionately high, well above the level of due care. At
safety level X, the total safety expense (B,) added to the probable acci-
dent loss (PL) greatly exceeds the total at the due care level (point
0), Bo + PL,. (That is, B. + PLx > B, + PLo.) At the higher level, an
automobile producer is forced to manufacture a product that resem-
143. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
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bles a Sherman tank in order to avoid an accident that is the eco-
nomic equivalent of a hangnail. This dysfunctional effect results from
the response of a rational manufacturer to excess damage liability.
This analysis dovetails with the theory of punitive damages set out
in earlier sections of this Article.145 The goal of the tort system is to
create precisely that level of deterrence at which the producer is moti-
vated to match safety expenses and accident costs so that B = PL.'4 6 If,
owing to underprosecution or nonrecovery, compensatory damages
fail to achieve this level, the economic theory means that the law
should impose punitive damages to close the gap. Inadequate use of
punitive damages means a market that produces cheap cars, which are
undesirable even though inexpensive, because they are made without
seat belts and with exploding gasoline tanks. Punitive-damage
overkill, on the other hand, means that the tort system forces produc-
tion of clumsy, armored vehicles with little enhancement in safety.
Consumers of products affected by this overkill will discover that the
products are more expensive and more difficult to find, even if the
products are useful and desirable. Once again, an excess of punitive
damages applied to producers of life-saving medicines, ambulances,
or services of physicians will both restrict the output of these goods
and services and price them out of the reach of some consumers.
II. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE ECONOMIC APPROACH: IMPERFECTIONS
IN THE MESSAGE
Any effort to apply these principles to actual decisions about evi-
dence and punitive damages, however, must take account of the limits
of the economic theory upon which they rest. This Part of the Article
considers two kinds of limits that may cause the theory to send the
wrong message to actors in the marketplace. First, difficulties with
obtaining necessary information about the economic conditions may
produce the wrong level of punitive damages.' 47 Second, the eco-
nomic theory set forth here is largely divorced from moral concerns.
A deontological analysis of punitive damages-an approach emphasiz-
ing moral duty, "oughtness," or right and wrong-may give different
answers about the kinds of evidence rules that are desirable.' 48 This
Part concludes that the economic theory must be considered in light
of these limits, but that it still is a useful tool for analysis of punitive
damages and the evidence rules that influence them.
145. See supra Part I.B.
146. See supra fig.6.
147. See infra Part II.A.
148. See infra Part II.B.
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A. The Consequences of Lack of Information: Incommensurability,
Irrationality, and Uncertainty
Diagrams such as Figures 1 through 6 conceal some fearsome dif-
ficulties. They are useful because they clarify economic relationships.
But they achieve this clarification precisely because they remove other
problems. For example, a real firm in a real marketplace cannot con-
sult any handbook or web site that will show it the precise contours of
the social marginal cost curve. The firm is more likely to be able to
derive its own private marginal cost curve, but even this is arrived at
with a great deal of guesswork.14 9 In summary, principles of evidence
and jury control must take account of incommensurability, irrational-
ity, and uncertainty, if they are to work in the real world.15 °
1. Incommensurability of Values.-When we compare accident
losses and safety expenses, we are in a sense comparing apples to or-
anges. Justice Scalia stated the problem well when he observed, in
Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises,151 that the Supreme Court
often is called upon to decide "whether a particular line is longer than
a particular rock is heavy."152 Thus, in the abortion cases, the Court
has undertaken to "balance" the societal interests in preserving poten-
tial life against individual abortion-related interests such as care of an
unwanted child.15 There is no common measure for these values,
just as there is no common unit for apples and oranges. 154 It might be
supposed that the balancing by the Court would be more reliable
when one factor seems far more prominent than another, as if we
compared a six-inch line with a thousand-pound rock. But this ap-
pearance of accuracy is illusory. What if the line is a chain of plati-
149. Cf SAMUELSON & NoRDHAus, supra note 52, at 595-600 (discussing the economics of
uncertainty, particularly with regard to risk premiums); SEIDENFELD, supra note 52, at 66
(treating imperfect information as a market deficiency).
150. See SHAVELL, supra note 34, at 79-83 (discussing the effects of uncertainty, error, and
misperception). See generally Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method
for HelpingJuries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CAL. L. REV. 773 (1995)
(using market methods to provide alternatives to the arbitrariness of tort awards that result
from deficient information, compensation, and enforcement).
151. 486 U.S. 888 (1988).
152. Id. at 897 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
153. Cf Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845-49 (1992) (reaffirming the es-
sential holding of Roe v. Wade but recognizing that its boundaries are not susceptible to the
expression of a simple rule); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (holding that the right
of personal privacy includes the abortion decision but that it is qualified by certain inter-
ests of the state).
154. Cf LAURENCE TRiBE, ABORTION: THE CIASH OF ABSOLUTES 27-41 (1990) (demon-
strating the incommensurability of the two competing values implicated in the abortion
debate-a fetus's right to live and a woman's right to personal autonomy).
[VOL. 57:174
19981 EVIDENCE, ECONOMICS, AND ETHICS
num, while the rock is only a half-ton of cracked limestone?155 In the
tort arena, the risk of loss of life or paraplegic injuries may be weighed
against the consumer's ability to choose an attractive convertible in
the automobile market.
156
The economist assumes that each of these values can be trans-
lated into dollar amounts."5 ' This is one of several assumptions that
enables the economist to draw clear diagrams, and although the re-
sulting clarity is useful in illustrating economic tradeoffs, 58 the fact
that the tradeoffs are of incommensurate values must not be forgot-
ten. In some instances, the law recognizes the Herculean difficulty of
placing dollar amounts on values-in fixing damages for the wrongful
loss of a human life, for example-and the governing legal principles
normally must recognize the roughness of the result. 59 Still other
values, such as love, achievement, or pleasure, are similarly difficult to
quantify, although again the law does so when it is necessary.16 ° Plac-
155. Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779,
818-20 (1994) (discussing approaches by the law to valuation of, or refusal of the law to
value, intangible goods such as life, love, etc.).
156. This is so because the product must be "unreasonably dangerous," meaning that its
risk must be disproportionate to the utility derived from it. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965). "Utility" in this context includes aesthetic concerns: "Good
whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make some people drunk,
and is especially dangerous to alcoholics; but bad whiskey, containing a dangerous amount
of fusel oil, is unreasonably dangerous." Id.
157. See POSNER, supra note 59, at 165 (graphing, on the same dollar scale, damages
from injuries against production costs or burdens).
There are at least two arguments countervailing against a concern about incommensu-
rability. First, the purpose of punitive damages is to put a price on the activity, and so
there is no incommensurability for the defendant, who weighs dollars against dollars. The
law merely speaks in the same language as the defendant. The trouble with this reasoning,
however, is that it does not solve the problem of the lawgiver or adjudicator, who must fix
the amount of the sanction by considering incommensurate values and making them,
somehow, commensurate. Second, it is likely that any other remedy (e.g., imprisonment)
will exhibit the same problems of incommensurability, so that the alternative is to do
nothing.
158. Thus, for example, Gary S. Becker has demonstrated the usefulness of economic
analysis in predicting a wide variety of human behavior that otherwise might be thought of
as non-economic, including crime, racial discrimination, and marriage and divorce. See
generally GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1981) (demonstrating an economic
approach to aspects of family life); GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN
BEHAVIOR (1976).
159. See, e.g., Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 364 P.2d 337, 345 (Cal. 1961) (recog-
nizing the difficulty of valuing pain and suffering, but nevertheless recognizing the right to
a limited recovery); Sullivan v. Old Colony St. Ry. Co., 83 N.E. 1091, 1092 (Mass. 1908)
("The rule of damages is a practical instrumentality for the administration of justice. ...
Its object is to afford the equivalent in money for the actual loss caused by the wrong of
another.").
160. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 251, 252, 254 (Tex. 1983) (overrul-
ing past decisions, limiting wrongful-death recovery to pecuniary amounts, and allowing
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ing a dollar value on the abstract right to the freedom of speech based
upon its importance to our republic, as the district judge charged the
jury to do in the Stachura case discussed above, 161 takes the problem
into another dimension. In any event, this problem of incommensu-
rability is an important consideration in crafting real-world rules of
evidence and jury control for punitive damages.
2. Irrationality of Enforcement.-Even if we could derive clear, ac-
curate curves by perfectly translating into dollars all accident losses,
from hedonic pain to loss of life, and comparing them to accurate
totals of all safety expenses, we would face a second and related diffi-
culty. Marginal cost curves are meaningless unless decisionmakers un-
derstand them. It would be necessary to educate every judge, and for
that matter every juror, in the economic theory that begins this Arti-
cle.162 We would need to explain social marginal cost curves and their
interrelationships with damage principles in jury instructions that
could be perfectly understood by lay jurors, who then would apply
them without confusing them with concepts such as moral blame. 6 '
Furthermore, and most importantly, because the economic purpose
of our tort system is to consider inducements for firms to produce
efficiently while internalizing accident costs, we would need to ensure
that the meaning of every verdict, present or future, would be ade-
quately known to every firm. If a very high punitive award, for exam-
ple, were to be based upon the jury's perception of a peculiar fact-
bound instance of underdeterrence, the firm would need to react to
the meaning of the verdict by perceiving the limits on ways in which
the verdict could be applied to that firm's (presumably different)
circumstances.1
64
recovery for intangibles such as companionship). But cf Hogan v. Santa Fe Trail Transp.
Co., 85 P.2d 28, 33-34 (Kan. 1938) (disallowing the recovery of $4000 awarded by the jury
as compensation for the loss of enjoyment of playing the violin, but recognizing that pain
and suffering were compensable).
161. See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
162. Cf SAMUELSON & Noamious, supra note 52, at 8 ("After you have studied and
learned a body of economic principles, you comprehend reality in a new and different
way." (emphasis omitted)). For an interesting effort to provide better jury guidance, see
Oscar G. Chase, HelpingJurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763,
777-78 (1995), which advocates that jurors be furnished with grids or charts containing
median, high, and low sums awarded in previous cases for each of the widely accepted
nine-point severity levels.
163. Economics is a science of rational choice and of the effects of incentives. See Pos-
NER, supra note 59, at 3-4. Deontological reasoning is described in infra Part II.B.
164. See POSNER, supra note 59, at 3-4 (explaining the assumption of rational self-inter-
est). It is not necessary, however, that all participants act consciously for a message of this
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In practice, judges do not mathematically follow either economic
principles or rules of law.165 This failure creates slippage in the theory
of deterrence. Furthermore, jurors cannot be screened for under-
standing of economic theory; indeed, they often fail to apprehend rel-
atively simple instructions.166 This failure produces more slippage.
And finally, the producer ordinarily can make only the crudest guess
concerning the relevance of a novel jury verdict, even assuming the
firm or its insurer knows of it.1 67 These elements of irrationality are
another factor influencing evidence rules and jury control of punitive
damages.
3. Uncertainty of Liability in the Future.-Learned Hand's BPL
formula assumes that factors such as the "probability" of accidents are
known, 16 8 but if so, they are known in only a very general way. Some-
times, recurring situations can be subjected to actuarial analysis, but
even this science is imperfect, because it depends upon evaluation of
past circumstances and their comparison to a different future.1 6 9 The
firm considering production efficiency against safety expenses cannot
precisely know either the probability that an additional dollar of safety
expense will avoid an accident or the mathematically expected loss
kind to be communicated. Id. For example, the result might occur because of specifica-
tions by an insurer who is better informed than individual insureds.
165. Cf Clayton P. Gillette, Rules, Standards and Precautions in Payment Systems, 82 VA. L.
REv. 181, 185-86 (1996) (describing the effects of uncertainty in commercial law and the
means of dealing with it); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment of Dam-
ages, 39J.L. & ECON. 191, 201-03 (1996) (demonstrating systematic factors that distort dam-
age awards and defeat the public understanding of those factors); Rolando F. Pelifez,
Higgledy-Piggledy Awards for Lost Earnings, 36JURIMETRICs J. 325, 336 (1996) (demonstrating
that "the below-market method forecloses accuracy in the discounting process and opens
the way to spectacular award errors"); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A
Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L. REv. 781, 814-21 (1983) (catalogu-
ing reasons why stare decisis is ineffectual and why resulting legal rules are indeterminate);
Richard Whisnant & Diane DeWitt Cherry, Economic Analysis of Rules: Devolution, Evolution
and Realism, 31 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 693, 728 (1996) (describing the economics of en-
forcement uncertainty in the regulatory environment).
166. See, e.g., Leonard V. Sand & Steven Alan Reiss, A Report on Seven Experiments Con-
ducted by District Court Judges in the Second Circuit, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 423, 456 (1985) (citing
experiments that assist jurors' understandings of lengthy charges); J. Alexander Tanford,
The Law and Psychology ofJury Instructions, 69 NEB. L. REv. 71, 79 (1990) (stating that psycho-
logical studies conclude that jury instructions are often incomprehensible to jurors).
167. Even legal advice from a knowledgeable professional is often crude. Cf CRUMP ET
AL., supra note 82, at 1104-07 (documenting the reaction of banking attorneys to a complex
decision, which imposed liability on a lender after foreclosure).
168. See POSNER, supra note 59, at 165; see also supra notes 140-141 and accompanying
text.
169. See SAMUELSON & NoRDHAus, supra note 52, at 595-602 (explaining the difficulty of
predicting the future).
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from the accident. 170 For that matter, it cannot predict the evidence
rules and legal principles that a future jury will apply to such a hypo-
thetical accident years from now. 171
Evidence and jury-control principles depend heavily upon these
formidable difficulties. The goal of real-world trials cannot be the
precise punitive award that exactly balances safety expenses and acci-
dent costs; rough estimation is all that can be attempted. In many
instances, a court will be forced to sacrifice accuracy for a clarity of
expression that reduces the problems of incommensurability, irration-
ality, and uncertainty that are inherent in the tort system.1 72 It proba-
bly is not worth the candle, for example, to have expert economists
routinely testify about supply and demand or to fix the dollar level of
appropriate deterrence in car wreck cases. We usually do not instruct
juries in terms such as marginal costs, transaction costs, or the law of
diminishing returns, and we do not expect manufacturers to have to
use these concepts to understand the verdicts that result.171
Nevertheless, the economic analysis of punitive damages should
be influential. Although we should not choose an ostensibly accurate
principle if it is incomprehensible or misleading in the context of a
jury trial, we should not make the opposite error either. That is to say,
we should not adopt a given principle, or rely upon a given type of
information, merely because it is clearly known. The principle or in-
formation may, in fact, be inaccurate and misleading.1 74 This delicate
balance between accuracy and clarity should animate the derivation of
evidence rules and jury control for punitive damages. It is to this sub-
ject, therefore, that Part III of this Article will turn later. Presently,
this Article will consider a second limit on the economic analysis: the
deontological approach.
170. See id. In theory, uncertainty by itself should not create this problem unless errors
cumulate. Cf id. at 9-10. Pure uncertainty, if unaccompanied by bias, sometimes will un-
derdeter and sometimes will overdeter, and if the two possibilities are equal, the firm's
calculus will not be disadvantaged by it. But this theory assumes perfectly unbiased uncer-
tainty, which is an improbable state of affairs given the plaintiffs burden of proof. Further-
more, the theory assumes no effect from risk aversion.
171. See SHAvEu., supra note 34, at 82 (describing the uncertainty of how courts will
evaluate future evidence).
172. See CRUMP ET AL., supra note 82, at 873. This is the thrust of the movement for
"plain language" injury instructions. Id. The difficulty is that so-called plain language is
rarely clear and precise for every use to which it might be put in an actual case. Id.
173. See infta Part III.B.3 (discussing advantages and disadvantages of admitting these
kinds of evidence in some punitive-damages cases).
174. An example is the admissibility of net-worth evidence as a guide to the determina-
tion of punitive damages. See infta Part III.B.1 (concluding that net-worth evidence should
be excluded).
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B. Evidence Relating to Moral Duties: Deontological Factors
in Punitive Damages
1. Comparing Consequentialist and Deontological Analyses of Punish-
ment.-The economic arguments sketched above are utilitarian or
consequentialist. They seek to maximize utility by using a less costly
deterrent to minimize costly behavior. 7 5 But there are ways to evalu-
ate punitive damages by measures that in some instances have argua-
ble claims to superiority over the marketplace view with which they
may conflict. Specifically, one may consider punitive damages as a
deontological device,1 76 concerned less with maximizing utility than
with moral duty.1 77 In this alternate view, the justification for exem-
plary damages is not their function in correcting market deficien-
cies. 1 8 Instead, it is an expression of rightness and wrongness, ofjust
deserts, or of moral blameworthiness.'
Whereas the consequentialist views the deterrent message per-
ceived by uninvolved actors in the marketplace as the principal pur-
pose of a sanction (even to the exclusion of compensation of persons
unjustly injured), the deontologist emphasizes the individual moral
positions of the participants in the event.18 0 The plaintiff, in this view,
deserves compensation not because compensation serves an economic
function, but because it is "right." 1 ' Similarly, the actor who is in-
volved in what we refer to as causation of the injury is to be punished
in accordance with the degree of that person's moral blameworthi-
175. Cf Pardlett, supra note 25, at 795-800 (describing deterrence theory and distin-
guishing it from retributive or moral justifications of punitive damages). See generally Avery
Wiener Katz, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Economics, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2229
(1996) (contrasting the positivist or descriptive approach of economists to the normative
or prescriptive orientation of lawyers).
176. Deontology is the study of "ethics dealing esp[ecially] with duty, moral obligation,
and right action." RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DIcrIoNARY 362 (1995).
177. See Partlett, supra note 25, at 800-02 (explaining the moral basis of punitive dam-
ages); see alsoJane B. Baron &Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Against Market Rationality: Moral Critiques of
Economic Analysis in Legal Theory, 17 CARDozo L. REv. 431, 431-32 (1996) (arguing the supe-
riority of moral justifications over market theories for certain of our most important val-
ues); Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REv. 249, 251-52 (1996)
(justifying negligence law by reference to moral theory).
178. See generally Partlett, supra note 25 (arguing that punitive damages are used for
social reasons).
179. See id. at 801.
180. See Hurd, supra note 177, at 252-54 (distinguishing consequentialism and deontol-
ogy); see also Katz, supra note 175, at 2241 (describing the orientation of economists toward
descriptive, as opposed to normative, approaches).
181. See Hurd, supra note 177, at 252-54.
1998]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ness, and not in a greater or lesser amount calculated by the need to
communicate a corrective to the marketplace.1 8
2
These premises, in the punitive-damages context, lead to an em-
phasis upon the accomplishment of retributive justice against morally
blameworthy injurers. Closely connected to this retributive principle
is the idea that penalties should be proportionally graded.'83 To take
an example from recent news stories, a school principal might seek to
explain a severe punishment, such as expulsion, for a child who pos-
sesses Advil or Midol, on the ground that it carries out the school's
policy of zero tolerance toward drugs. 184 The consequentialist would
ask whether this sanction produces more cumulative benefit in terms
of its deterrent purpose than the total of costs or disadvantages attrib-
utable to it. The deontologist, on the other hand, would inquire
whether the punishment has been triggered by a sufficient violation of
moral duty and whether it is proportional to this individual's blame-
worthiness. It is possible that the consequentialist would see the
means (i.e., the severe consequences borne by one individual) asjusti-
fied by the end (i.e., the cumulative benefits to all others in the soci-
ety). The deontologist would be troubled, however, by the sacrifice of
the individual for the allegedly greater welfare of the many. Deonto-
logical reasoning thus includes asking whether the end justifies the
means.
185
Still another deontological concept is that of expiation.' 86 Pun-
ishment serves the function of discharging the actor's moral debt and
fits the wrongdoer for full acceptance back into the society.' 87 Punish-
ment also may serve the purpose of condemnation. 88 It thereby pro-
182. Cf H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILrY 231 (1968) (positing three condi-
tions for punishment: a voluntary act that is morally wrong, a punishment that is in some
way equivalent in severity to the wrong, and that such punishment is just or morally good).
183. See id. at 160-70; see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.02(3) (West 1994) (including
among the objectives of the code "to prescribe penalties that are proportionate to the
seriousness of offenses").
184. See Student Suspended for Cariying Advil; Girl Says Punishment "Too Severe"; Texas School
Defends Policy, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1996, at A13, available in 1996 WL 13425589.
185. The foremost proponent of this view, still, is Immanuel Kant. See IMMANUEL KANT,
THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 99-107 (John Ladd trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1965)
(1797); see also Hurd, supra note 177, at 250 (citing Kant for the deontologist's belief in
punishment "[w]hen and only when [persons] deserve retribution").
186. See FRANZ ALEXANDER & HUGO STAUB, THE CRIMINAL, THE JUDGE AND THE PUBLIC
212-14 (rev. ed. 1956).
187. See id. at 212 (stating that rehabilitation, even if effectual, "will not remove the
emotional demand that crime must be expiated").
188. See HART, supra note 182, at 169-73 (discussing the denunciatory theory of punish-
ment); see also Partlett, supra note 25, at 803 (dealing with the related but distinct elements
of retribution and denunciation).
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duces in morally upright people the satisfaction that justice is
intact, t89 expresses solidarity with innocent injured persons so as to
assuage their suffering, 19 ° and compensates for losses so that
nonresponsible persons do not undergo the unfair burden of bearing
them.19 ' Each of these considerations is related to deontological con-
cepts or to retributive justice, although these ideas also may be related
to consequentialist reasoning. 192
Few people are exclusively consequentialists, and few are pure de-
ontologists. The deontologist, for example, cannot claim to use
purely moral principles to derive all of the answers to production or
pricing problems facing a firm in the workplace. Likewise, the conse-
quentialist cannot pretend that every decision can be based upon indi-
vidualized determination of costs and risks, as opposed to relying for
some decisions upon rules or norms.193 Moreover, the consequential-
ist cannot persuasively defend a regime that unfairly imposes crushing
burdens on random individuals to achieve general goals. In contem-
plating the need to deter drunk drivers, for example, even a person
who predominantly is a consequentialist would be unlikely to advance
an argument favoring the death penalty for slightly intoxicated of-
189. See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOcIETY 108-09 (George Simpson
trans., Collier-MacMillan Ltd. 1933) (1893) ("We can thus say without paradox that pun-
ishment is above all designed to act upon upright people .... ."); JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND
DESERVING 98, 100-05, 115-16 (1970) (developing subsidiary purposes of this condemna-
tion aspect, including authoritative disavowal, symbolic nonacquiescence, vindication of
the law, and absolution of others); 2 SIRJAMFS FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMI-
NAL LAw OF ENGLAND 81 (1883) (stating that the "close alliance between criminal law and
moral sentiment is in all ways healthy and advantageous to the community").
190. One theory of this kind is that punishment annuls the wrong done. See GEORG
WILHELM FIERICH HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 38 (T.M. Knox trans., Encyclopedia
Britannica 1952) (1821) ("The annulment of the crime is retribution."). A different way of
putting it is that punishment enables the injured person to overcome the mastery asserted
by the wrongdoer and to regain the equality and dignity that existed before the act. See
Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 1659, 1685-86 (1992) (arguing that retribution must acknowledge the damage to the
victim's worth and repair the damage to the victim's ability to realize the value of her
worth).
191. This is so especially for compensatory damages, but it also has been advanced in
support of punitive damages to the extent that they fill gaps in compensation (as distinct
from deterrence) left by attorneys' fees, rules of nonrecovery, and incomplete damages.
See Partlett, supra note 25, at 793-95.
192. See infra notes 195-196 and accompanying text (discussing the interrelatedness of
the two theories).
193. Thus, the deontologist cannot plausibly pretend that a distinct moral imperative
should govern every question of economically efficient production, nor can the conse-
quentialist credibly maintain that every moral question should be controlled by an ad hoc
calculus of cost and benefit that dispenses with all other rules or principles. See Hurd,
supra note 177, at 253-54.
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fenders on the ground that theoretical economic calculations proved
that the execution of the first unfortunate arrestee would produce de-
terrence powerful enough to result in a net benefit.'94
In fact, it is possible to argue that moral retributivism is really a
disguised form of utilitarianism.1 15 In this view, for example, propor-
tional justice is beneficial because it adjusts the deterrent to avoid hid-
den costs such as public resistance or rebellion against punishments
perceived as unfair. Likewise, condemnation and compensation pro-
duce utility in terms of better performance by the generally law-abid-
ing population. Perhaps it is equally possible to view some kinds of
consequentialism as disguised forms of deontology.' 6 In this view,
the retributive correctness of punishments is related to the market-
place, because moral blameworthiness is related to the calculus of
risk, or to the excusability (or lack thereof) of the actor's particular
resolution of the balancing of the likelihood of harm against the bur-
den of precautions.
2. Deontological Considerations Governing Evidence for Determining
Punitive Damages.-It follows that considerations of retributive justice
may be useful measures for evaluating punitive damages, even in
those cases in which the damages can be justified by market considera-
tions. A purely economic view might support the imposition of puni-
tive damages on a few randomly identified actors in amounts
disproportionate to their fault, on the ground that their losses will be
exceeded by the benefits of deterrence to others.' 7 A deontological
view will serve to limit this effect. 198
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore'9' is the Supreme Court's most
recent pronouncement on the constitutional limits of punitive dam-
ages, and it shows the heavy influence of deontological considera-
tions.20 0 Gore bought an automobile that had been repainted to
194. Cf POSNER, supra note 59, at 224-25 (analyzing the disadvantages of using severe
penalties in an attempt at perfectly deterring minor crimes).
195. Cf Partlett, supra note 25, at 806 (arguing that retributive theory "looks to conse-
quences and is to be so judged").
196. For a hierarchical view of the two conceptions, see Hurd, supra note 177, at 253-54.
Professor Hurd sees consequentialist limits as general guidelines trumped by the more-
specific principles of deontology: "[T]he principal payoff of deontological maxims is their
ability to define and patrol the borders of consequential justification." Id. at 254.
197. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
199. 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
200. See id.; see also Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 805, 809-13 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying BMW
to reduce the award of $200,000 in punitive damages against a police officer in a civil rights
case on the ground that it was out of line with awards in more egregious cases); Continen-
tal Trend Resources, Inc. v. OXY USA Inc., 101 F.3d 634, 63543 (10th Cir. 1996) (applying
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correct minor pre-delivery damage, but BMW did not inform him of
this arguable defect.2"1 The repainting caused a diminution in value
that the jury compensated by a $4 thousand award.2"2 The jury also
awarded $4 million in punitive damages, which the Alabama Supreme
Court later reduced to $2 million.2"' The United States Supreme
Court's opinion, rejecting this punitive award as violative of due proc-
ess,20 4 combined consequentialist and deontological reasoning. It did
so by recognizing the state's affirmative interest in deterring undesir-
able conduct by economic means, a consequential goal, and by also
crediting the interest in punishing unlawful conduct, a deontological
purpose.20 5 The Court also limited the state's power to punitive
amounts that were not "grossly excessive."20 6 The Court defined this
limitation with three evidentiary factors, which in turn were partly
consequentialist and partly deontological.
The first factor, which the Court identified as perhaps the most
important, was the "degree of reprehensibility" of the defendant's
conduct.207 The Court's reasoning made this apparently deontologi-
cal consideration depend upon several subsidiary factors, which were
related more closely to moral blameworthiness than to utilitarian con-
cerns. For example, the Court pointed out that BMW's conduct did
not impair the car's performance and that the car manufacturer
evinced no indifference to life, health, or safety; Gore's loss, in the
eyes of the Court, was "purely economic." 20 8 Similarly, BMW acted
neither in bad faith nor deliberately, and it avoided such blameworthy
conduct as false statements, acts of affirmative misconduct, and con-
cealment of evidence. 20 9 A consequentialist, in contrast, would not
have concentrated upon the blameworthiness of BMW's mental
processes or upon any categorical difference between "health and
safety" and "economic" interests. Instead, the consequentialist would
have inquired into the cumulative gains of the society from the deter-
rent and would have evaluated whether they exceeded the total costs.
The gains would have been measured in economic terms, irrespective
BMWin a commercial case to reduce a $30 million award to $6 million), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 1846 (1997).
201. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1593.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1594-95.
204. Id. at 1604.
205. Id. at 1595.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1599.
208. Id. at 1592.
209. Id. at 1601.
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of their origin in safety or aesthetics, and the costs would have been
evaluated similarly in economic terms, independently of BMW's mens
rea. 11° The Court's reasoning on the basis of "reprehensibility"
211
thus was largely deontological.
The second factor identified in the BMW case was the ratio be-
tween the plaintiff's actual loss and the punitive award.212 This factor
can be viewed in consequentialist terms: It is an effort, albeit an im-
perfect one, to increase the likelihood that the costs of the sanction
will not exceed the benefits that it is expected to produce. Strictly
speaking, the reasoning would not be valid unless all societal benefits
were compared to all social costs, 2 13 but perhaps informational diffi-
culties make this degree of accuracy seem so ambitious that they jus-
tify the rougher measure 4.2 1  In the alternative, consideration of the
actual-damages-to-punitive-damages ratio can be defended in deonto-
logical terms, because actual damages provide a measure-albeit an
exceedingly rough measure-of the actor's moral blameworthiness.
This conclusion rests on the assumption that just deserts depend
upon a combination of guilty mind, wrongful conduct, and an injuri-
ous result that correlates, in turn, with the harm suffered by a ran-
domly identified victim.
Finally, the Court considered the difference between this punitive
award and civil or criminal sanctions available for comparable miscon-
duct.215 The Court apparently considered these sanctions both as a
yardstick against which the tribunal should measure the present
amount and as a means of notice that would enable the actor to pre-
dict the consequences of chosen courses of conduct.216 Again, this
factor is capable of being analyzed in deontological terms, in that the
comparison to like conduct correlates with a concern for retributive
proportionality. The existence of notice is evidence of a morally
blameworthy mental state. However, the analysis also can be under-
taken in consequentialist terms, in that notice is related to the effec-
tiveness of the deterrent. Furthermore, the Court used the
comparison to demonstrate that there was no reason to assume "that a
more modest sanction would not have been sufficient, 2 1' 7 and this
210. See supra Part II.B.1.
211. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1599.
212. Id. at 1601.
213. See supra Part I.
214. See supra Part II.A.
215. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1603.
216. See id.
217. Id.
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logic is consistent with economic reasoning, which seeks to assure that
the cost does not exceed the expected gain.
BMW is a constitutional decision, and as such, it only sets limits
upon the states' abilities to assess punitive damages."1 8 It does not
specify how the amount must be determined. Its deontological rea-
soning, therefore, is important as a means of restricting punitive dam-
ages at the margin, but it does not tell us the best way for a state to go
about the specific business of computing them. In particular, it does
not negate the possibility that consequentialist reasoning, such as the
economic theory set out in this Article, may be the preferred method
for calculating the award, with deontological considerations serving as
a limit.2
19
C. Synthesis: An Economic Approach, Limited by Informational and
Deontological Concerns
In summary, informational deficiencies and deontological criti-
cisms arguably mean that an economic perspective on punitive dam-
ages should not be the exclusive focus. And yet there are justifications
for heavily emphasizing economic analysis in formulating evidence
rules for trials involving punitive damages.22 ° In the first place, the
sanction is itself meant to be experienced in economic terms. It often
is imposed upon actors immersed in economically motivated activity,
under circumstances in which the countervailing considerations are
those of the marketplace.22 '
Furthermore, considerations of moral blameworthiness are read-
ily arguable from the evidence of conduct at issue and are made pal-
pable by the evidence of individual injuries. What are less tangible in
such cases are the larger consequences upon the society as a whole,
largely in economic terms, of which evidence is more diffuse and diffi-
cult to apply.2 22 Precise deontological rules are likely to be lacking
218. See id. at 1602-03.
219, Perhaps this reasoning dovetails with the general relationship between the two ap-
proaches: Arguably, deontology best serves to limit consequential reasoning. See supra
note 196.
220. The most carefully reasoned argument for consequentialism in the form of eco-
nomic deterrence as the "principal or only basis" for punitive damages is probably Dan B.
Dobbs, Ending Punishment in "Punitive" Damages: Deterrence-Measured Remedies, 40 ALA. L.
REV. 831, 858-63 (1989). For a contrary view, advancing retributive theory as superior to
both compensation and deterrence, see Partlett, supra note 25, at 800-06.
221. As has been indicated above, the theory in this Article best fits the economically
motivated actor, as opposed to the actor who derives illicit utility from the infliction of
harm itself. See supra note 34.
222. See infra Part III.B.3-4 (discussing the feasibility of admitting evidence about the
deterrence gap or about profitability).
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when it comes to production decisions, and the effort to derive them
on an ad hoc basis in individual cases involving severe injuries has
high potential to mislead. Thus, for example, it often is possible for
an advocate to deride an efficient production decision as motivated by
profits at the expense of lives,223 so that a powerfully appealing deon-
tological principle appears to be implicated.224 In fact, however, the
result of such reasoning may be erroneous. At some point, efficient
production decisions are proper even if they carry unavoidable dan-
gers of accident and injury. This must be the case if we are to avoid
shutting down production altogether, everywhere, with the result that
we would inflict on ourselves losses far exceeding those of the acci-
dents the questioned activity could ever cause. 22- A consequentialist
theory based on deterrence would distinguish this case from one in
which punitive damages are appropriate.226 Many of the wide variety
of deontological claims that might be invoked, however, would not.
2 27
And yet, like the unqualified people-over-profits principle described
above, deontological claims may resemble the song of the Sirens in
their appeal.
A synthesis of these concepts, therefore, may warrant considera-
tion of rules for punitive damages expressed primarily in terms of
their economic validity. But the economic conclusions must be evalu-
ated, in turn, against considerations of information deficiency and
consistency with deontological concerns. For example, a given type of
evidence may be correlated only roughly with measures of economic
efficiency, but it may be superior to other types of evidence that might
theoretically be considered more accurate, if the evidence can be
223. For a scholarly analysis of this and other simplistic logical constructs that furnish
time-honored and effective (but often misleading) jury arguments, see generally Neal R.
Feigenson, The Rhetoric of Torts: How Advocates Help Jurors Think About Causation, Reasonable-
ness, and Responsibility, 47 HASTINcs L.J. 61 (1995).
224. The defendant, too, can easily mislead by false deontology. An example, which is
just as far off the point as the plaintiffs denunciation of "profits," is the defendant who
argues that a plaintiff claiming intangible or exemplary damages is "greedy." Cf In Summa-
tion, Simpson's Lawyer Decries "Character Assassination, " Hous. CHRON., Jan. 23, 1997, at Al 1,
available in 1997 WL 6536379 (reporting O.J. Simpson's defense lawyer as arguing that the
Goldman family's civil suit "isn't a fight for justice, it's a fight for money").
225. Thus, for example, the law of product liability recognizes that it is not tortious to
sell dangerous products if they are not "unreasonably dangerous." See RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965). Many products are unavoidably unsafe. See id. cmt. k.
226. See id. cmt. i. The concept of "unreasonable" dangerousness invokes the risk-utility
calculus that permits the distribution of products that are unavoidably unsafe but neverthe-
less beneficial. See id.
227. See generally Feigenson, supra note 223 (describing jury strategies for finding liability
based on the following notions: there must be a person to blame for every injury, bad acts
are committed by bad people, and people who cause severe injuries are "more responsible"
than those who cause lesser injuries).
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readily determined, understood by juries, and communicated to other
actors. Likewise, an economically efficient approach to evidence, but
one that achieves deterrence without due regard to distribution of
punishments according to moral blameworthiness, may be less accept-
able than one that is less immediately efficient, but that squares better
with the criterion of proportional justice. Thus, as some commenta-
tors have argued, economic-deterrent analysis should be the principal
ingredient,22 8 but as others have said, information deficiencies229 and
deontological concerns 2 0 should limit the calculation.
III. EVIDENCE TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF A PUNITIVE AwARD:
THE RuLEs AND THEIR APPLICATIONS
A. The Governing Rules of Evidence
There is no specific rule that governs evidence about the amount
of punitive damages. For the most part, the decisions are interpreta-
tions of the most general principles of evidence contained in Federal
Rules 401 through 403 or their state-law equivalents. 231 The structure
of these rules gives each a particular function. First, Rule 401 defines
relevant evidence in terms so broad that they arguably are all-inclu-
sive. Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency" to make a fact that is
"of consequence to the determination of the action" more or less
likely.232
Rule 402, in turn, makes relevant evidence admissible, unless it is
excluded by another rule or principle.233 It also provides that evi-
dence that is not relevant is not admissible. 234 The breadth of the
definition of relevance, however, is such that Rule 402 will admit al-
most anything in any case. Elsewhere, in fact, the author of this Arti-
cle has argued that the literal terms of Rules 401 and 402 make them
perfectly transparent, so that, if interpreted literally, they never ex-
228. See supra note 220.
229. See supra Part II.A and authorities therein cited. This reasoning should not, how-
ever, cause us to substitute an inaccurate measure for an accurate one merely because it
can be calculated more readily. See infra Part III.B.1 (critiquing the use of net-worth
evidence).
230. Professor Hurd's formulation of this role for deontology is well phrased. See supra
-note 196.
231. FED. R. EVID. 401-403. For a striking example, see John Deere Co. v. May, 773 S.W.2d
369 (Tex. App. 1989, writ denied), in which the court interpreted the Texas equivalents of
these rules to uphold the admissibility of thirty-four separate accidents, with varying de-
grees of similarity to the event on trial, as relevant to punitive damages. Id. at 374.
232. FED. R. EVID. 401.
233. FED. R. Evin. 402.
234. Id.
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clude any arguable proposition.235 Even if the judge applies a prag-
matic gloss, as most courts do, Rules 401 and 402 provide an
exceedingly loose filter, which admits even evidence of marginal
relevance.236
This conclusion, however, does not mean that all marginally rele-
vant evidence will be admitted. It means only that the task is done
instead by exclusionary rules. Foremost among these exclusionary
principles is Rule 403, which provides that relevant evidence is not
admissible if its probative value is "substantially outweighed" by cer-
tain counterweights, which include prejudice, confusion, and waste of
time, among others.23 7 Even this rule, however, is "loaded": It is bi-
ased in favor of admissibility. The mere existence of prejudice will not
exclude. Even the presence of a substantial amount of prejudice will
not exclude. Furthermore, prejudice will not exclude even if it
counterbalances or even exceeds the probative value. It is only when
prejudice or other counterweights "substantially" outweigh the proba-
tive value of an item of evidence that it is excludable under Rule
403.238
Other rules may come into play with regard to punitive damages,
but only as to narrow classes of evidence. Rule 407, for example, ex-
cludes subsequent remedial measures offered to prove negligence or
culpable conduct. 23 9 Although such evidence may be admissible for
other purposes, 2 41 this exclusion probably disallows the use of subse-
quent remedial measures to determine liability for punitive damages,
and probably the amount as well.2 1 Rule 411 excludes evidence of
liability insurance to prove fault. 242 Again, however, the exclusion
does not apply if the evidence is offered for another purpose.2 4 3
There have been suggestions, for example, that the jury should know
235. See David Crump, On the Uses of Irrelevant Evidence, 34 Hous. L. REv. 1, 9-14 (1997).
236. See id. at 14-17.
237. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
238. See id.; see also Crump, supra note 235, at 17-20.
239. See FED. R_ EVID. 407.
240. See id. (allowing evidence of subsequent remedial measures for other purposes, in-
cluding "proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if contro-
verted, or impeachment").
241. This arguably is so, because the tendency of the evidence to demonstrate "culpable
conduct" would overwhelm any other use in connection with punitive damages. See id.
(excluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures proving "negligence" or "culpable
conduct"); cf. FED. R EVID. 403 (excluding relevant evidence that is "substantially out-
weighed" by factors such as "unfair prejudice").
242. See FED. R. EVID. 411.
243. See id. (allowing evidence of liability insurance coverage for other purposes, includ-
ing "proof of agency, ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness").
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about insurance when assessing the amount of punitive damages, be-
cause punitive damages should hurt, or punish, the defendant.244
Application of all of these rules depends upon identification of
the underlying issues. Relevant evidence depends upon an inference
that is tied to an issue that is "of consequence to the determination of
the action." 24 5 Prejudice, in turn, is best defined as the degree to
which the evidence "suggest[s] decision on an improper basis."24 6 It
is here that the analysis of evidence in punitive-damage cases is weak-
est because of the lack of consensus about the reasons for imposing
them. As observed at the beginning of this Article, courts and legisla-
tures lack a coherent vision of the function they want punitive dam-
ages to serve, and therefore, they have no clear goal toward which
they can target their standards.247
B. Common Evidentiary Approaches to Determining
Punitive Damages: A Critique
1. Net-Worth Evidence: Is It, in Fact, Worthless?-Many jurisdic-
tions admit evidence of the defendant's wealth as a basis for determin-
ing the amount of a punitive award. 48 It is illustrative of the
confusion of goals that some other jurisdictions have excluded this
evidence on the ground that it is misleading and prejudicial. 249
Strangely, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws has approved a Model Punitive Damages Act that specifically
invites the jurors to consider the defendant's "financial condition,"
among other factors.25 °
This kind of evidence, however, ordinarily has little to do with
either economic goals of punitive damages or with deontology, and it
should be excluded. Net-worth evidence does not support the eco-
nomic function of punitive damages when viewed from an industry-
wide perspective. This function, as illustrated in Figure 3 above, is to
244. See PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN, EVIDENCE IN A NUTSHELL: STATE AND FEDERAL RULES 16 (2d
ed. 1981) (stating that a defendant's ability to pay is relevant where punitive damages are
requested "because such damages should have sting").
245. FED. R. EVID. 401.
246. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note.
247. See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
248. See, e.g., Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 684 So. 2d 685, 702 (Ala. 1996), vacated on other
grounds, 117 S. Ct. 288 (1996); Wayte v. Rollins Int'l, Inc., 215 Cal. Rptr. 59, 72 (Ct. App.
1985); Lunsford v. Morris, 746 S.W.2d 471, 476 (Tex. 1988).
249. Cf Annotation, Punitive Damages: Relationship to Defendant's Wealth as Factor in Deter-
mining Prriety of Award, 87 A.L.R.4TH 141, 181-84 (1991 & Supp. 1996) (listing cases in
which courts have held that the wealth of the defendant could not be considered by the
finder of fact in arriving at its award of punitive damages).
250. See MODEL PUNITIVE DAMAGES ACT § 4(a) (1996).
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combine with compensatory damages to provide the proper level of
deterrence for harmful conduct. Punitive damages should not be
either so small that they leave a deterrence gap, as in Figure 2, nor so
excessive that they result in overkill, as in Figure 4. In the latter situa-
tion, consumers find that purchases are more difficult and more ex-
pensive to complete, even in the case of crucially necessary products.
Perhaps an argument favoring net-worth evidence can be con-
structed concerning the risk-adverseness of individual actors in the
marketplace. A person's degree of risk aversion may change with
levels of wealth. Thus, we tend to suspect that the marginal utility of
wealth is inversely related to its absolute amount, or in other words,
that the utility of an additional dollar declines as a person becomes
more wealthy.251 To illustrate this particular case, Professor Shavell
provides a diagram identical to Figure 7, in which there is a concave
graph of utility versus wealth.252 In such a case, the argument could
be asserted that a greater sanction must be imposed upon a wealthy
individual to result in a degree of deterrence equivalent to that im-
posed by a smaller penalty upon a person of modest means.253
This argument has more potential to mislead, however, than to
justify such a conclusion. If punitive damages are assessed against a
publicly held corporation or other distinct business entity, as seems
typical of such cases,2 54 the graph may not have this concave shape.
Given their specifically economic purpose, such entities may be more
consistent throughout the range of wealth in their attitude toward
risk, or risk neutrality.255 Insurance, even for individuals, may have a
251. See SAvELL, supra note 34, at 187 & n.2.
252. See infra fig.7. This figure was reprinted from SHAVELL, supra note 34, at 188 fig.8.1.
253. Professor Shavell does not make this argument, and his reasoning explains its fal-
lacy. He points out that the graph of marginal utility must be determined by knowing a
person's actual degree of risk aversion at every level. See SHAVELL, supra note 34, at 187 &
n.2. In other words, the graph must be derived, rather than simply assumed to be concave.
See id.; accord Chapman & Trebilcock, supra note 25, at 802 (pointing out that we cannot
with any confidence assume that a $10,000 loss means less to a wealthy person than to a
poor individual (citing Milton Friedman & L.J. Savage, The Expected-Utility Hypothesis and the
Measurability of Utility, 60J. POL. ECON. 463 (1952))).
254. See infra note 268 and accompanying text; see also POLINSKY & SHAVELL, supra note
52, pt. 1V (discussing the punishment of firms in deontological terms). Polinsky and
Shavell raise questions about the appropriateness of punishing firms, as opposed to pun-
ishing culpable individuals within them; about the difficulty of showing that the punish-
ment of a firm actually will punish the individuals who are, in fact, culpable; and about the
likelihood that the punishment actually will hurt innocent individuals, such as sharehold-
ers or customers. Id. at 95-96.
255. See SHAVELL, supra note 34, at 189 (reasoning that a tendency toward this attitude is
likely, but noting that risk aversion for an individual firm depends upon communication
among shareholders, managers, and employees, regarding their respective attitudes).
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similar theoretical effect. Furthermore, the declining-utility argument
does not take into account the possibility that wealthy persons or firms
might engage in more transactions that would subject them to risk.256
Thus, if a $2 million corporation is subjected to twice the penalty for
each violation as its $1 million competitor, but the penalty is assessed
in twice as many cases because the $2 million firm has engaged in
twice as many transactions creating liability, the result may be an ex-
cessive reaction to the decline in marginal utility of wealth. This situa-
256. See Chapman & Trebilcock, supra note 25, at 803 (explaining that "radically inequi-
table results are likely to be generated by weighing corporate defendants' wealth in assess-
ing punitive damages," and giving a similar example).
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tion, then, would produce not only the classic kind of punitive-
damage overkill in which the defendant is given multiple punish-
ments, but also an overkill due to the misleading use of wealth in de-
termining punitive awards.
More importantly, the argument based on the marginal utility of
wealth attempts to prove too much. The graph shows a person of zero
net worth as having the highest marginal utility of wealth, and this is
true in the sense that the pauper is more excited about receiving a
dollar than is the millionaire.257 But if the argument were extended
indiscriminately to draw conclusions about responsiveness to a large
punitive-damage award, it would produce absurd results. The dubious
conclusion, then, would be that thejudgment-proof defendant fears a
large liability more than the person of means. In this topsy-turvy sce-
nario, a person with nothing to lose has the most to lose.
There is no reason to suppose, however, that the net worth of an
individual or firm has any fixed relationship to the frequency of its
misconduct in the marketplace, or to the deterrence gap. Such a cor-
relation would depend upon the theory that those who succeed in
achieving a positive financial condition tend to do so by dishonest or
predatory practices. It seems more likely that some successful persons
and firms are successful because they operate properly in the market-
place, while others do not. 58 Indeed, one might as easily infer that
marginal competitors (i.e., those in poor financial conditions) are the
most likely to cut corners by externalizing costs. This reasoning would
lead one to assess punitive damages in inverse proportion to net
worth, or in exactly the opposite way from the Uniform Commission-
ers' approach. 259 Both of these approaches are irrational.
In fact, one way to view the irrationality of reliance on net worth
is to consider a very large entity that becomes insolvent. In recent
years, large entities such as national department stores have filed peti-
tions in bankruptcy. 26° Imagine that such a bankrupt, but huge, cor-
poration were to engage deliberately in a fraudulent or extremely
257. See supra fig.7. This actually is the meaning of Professor Shavell's diagram. See
supra notes 251-253 and accompanying text.
258. Thus, for example, it seems possible that a well-to-do individual whose upbringing
stressed risk aversion, honesty, frugality, and respect for others would be more heavily de-
terred by the prospect of a given punitive-damage award than a person of marginal means,
especially if the latter person could not begin to pay the award.
259. See MODEL PUNITIVE DAMAGES Acr § 7 (1996) (allowing the admission of net-worth
evidence).
260. See, e.g., Richard D. Hylton, A Crisis Built on Debt; Despite Its Strong Reputation in
Retailing, Macy's Choices in the 80's Left It Crippled, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 27, 1992, at Al, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File (reviewing management missteps that led Macy's to
bankruptcy).
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dangerous course of conduct as a means. of ameliorating its insol-
vency. It would be counterproductive, then, to enable the defendant
to escape punitive-damage liability (or for that matter, to impose "neg-
ative" punitive damages, reducing the compensatory award), 261 but
this is exactly what the theory of net-worth evidence ostensibly calls
for.
In deontological terms, also, the admittance of net-worth evi-
dence seems irrational. Evidence of the defendant's wealth would be
excluded if it were offered in virtually any other kind of case.262 The
usual rule is that wealth or poverty, like such factors as ethnicity, gen-
der, and age, should not make a difference in adjudication of substan-
tive rights. 261
Perhaps it can be argued that punitive damages are different
from other punishments. 26  By this theory, the wealthy defendant
who misbehaves would be less severely punished by a given fine than
the marginal one who engages in the same conduct. It would follow,
then, that a larger fine must be imposed on a wealthy defendant to
achieve the same level of punishment. Alternatively, the wealthy de-
fendant may be considered more reprehensible than the marginal de-
fendant. But once again, it is unclear why a bankrupt (but very large)
department store, for example, should be treated more favorably
when it engages in the same conduct as an industry leader.
Finally, there is the argument that punitive damages should suf-
fice to "stop" the defendant's conduct or "get the defendant's atten-
tion." This, however, is an economic argument masquerading as
deontology; it is about deterrence. And the deterrent function of pu-
nitive damages occurs due to the underdeterrence, or gap, that is cre-
ated when compensatory damages are not perfectly recoverable for all
261. This reasoning assumes that if large positive net worth mandates adding to the
compensatory award, large negative net worth equivalently justifies subtracting from it.
This odd result is insupportable but follows the same logic.
262. Cf Brokopp v. Ford Motor Co., 139 Cal. Rptr. 888, 899 (Ct. App. 1977) (holding
that "[a]ppeals to the sympathy of the jury based on the size or corporate status of a de-
fendant are improper," but denying reversal because of the absence of an objection).
263. See id.
264. See Chapman & Trebilcock, supra note 25, at 801-02 (recognizing a "plausible argu-
ment" for differentiating punitive damages from other retributive sanctions that are objec-
tively equal despite wealth-e.g., incarceration-on the ground that monetary penalties, in
order to be equivalent, require distinctions on the basis of subjective attitudes toward
money). It should be noted that Chapman and Trebilcock reject the argument as valid "in
principle" but unworkable "as a practical matter." Id. at 802.
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losses.265 Again, there is no reason to suppose that this gap has any
close correlation with net worth.2 66
Instead, net-worth evidence seems to inject a significant amount
of prejudice, particularly if prejudice is defined as the "suggest[ion of]
decision on an improper basis."26 7 If net-worth evidence is received in
a unitary trial on liability, damages, and punitive damages, there is
likely to be a tendency toward jury misuse of this evidence to impose
liability and actual damages upon a defendant perceived as wealthy.
Recently, the California research firm Metricus conducted a na-
tionwide study, polling people eligible for jury duty. The findings in-
clude the following: (1) Even before knowing anything else about the
dispute, seventy percent were more likely to favor an individual over a
corporation; (2) respondents were "much more likely" to believe an
accusation that a defense lawyer was not telling the truth than the
same accusation about a plaintiffs lawyer; and most significantly, (3)
"60% of [potential] jurors deemed a $1 million judgment 'just a slap
on the hand' for a corporation. '"268
Some jurisdictions have addressed this problem by bifurcating
the trial: If, in the first trial, the jury finds liability for punitive dam-
ages (for example, with a gross negligence finding), a second trial is
held in which the defendant's net worth is exposed. 269 Normally,
however, jury selection and opening statements must forecast the is-
sues for the jurors. It would be difficult, in other words, to avoid hav-
ing the jurors focus upon net-worth issues early in the trial. The
bifurcation procedure, in fact, has resulted in some trials in which the
trial lawyers have concluded that the jurors speculated about the de-
fendants' net worths erroneously, believing that they were much
larger than they actually were; the result was prejudice just the
same.
270
And even if the prejudice could be cabined off, so that it does not
affect the findings of liability and actual damages, there remains the
problem that assessing punitive damages on the basis of wealth is itself
265. See supra Part I.B-C.
266. See supra notes 253, 258 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 246 and accompanying text (explaining the definition of prejudice
according to the Federal Rules of Evidence).
268. Stephen J. Adler, Corporations Face Uphill Struggle injury Trials Involving Individuals,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 1991, at B5, available in 1991 WL-WSJ 584290.
269. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
270. See, e.g., Mary Hull, Early Verdict Moriel Playing No Favorites, TEX. LAW., Sept. 12,
1994, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Txlawr File (describing the largest amount of
actual damages awarded in Travis County, Texas, in a case which prohibited evidence of
the defendant's net worth being heard until after a finding of gross negligence).
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a "decision on an improper basis."271 For the reasons given above,
neither economic nor deontological reasoning supports the use of
this factor. Furthermore, this factor seems dubious in light of the rea-
soning engaged in by the sixty percent of potential jurors who would
consider a $1 million judgment against a corporation as a "slap on the
hand."1 72 Instead, whether it is a slap on the hand is more closely
related to the size of the deterrence gap.
2. Caps, Limits, and Ratios.-Some jurisdictions limit punitive
damages by absolute caps: The award may not exceed a defined dol-
lar amount. 27  Others impose limits by ratios: The award may not
exceed an arithmetic multiple, defined by statute, of the actual dam-
ages. 74 Still other jurisdictions have enacted combinations of these
two approaches or have used other factors, such as the lesser of a fixed
dollar amount or the defendant's gross annual income, as a cap. 275
These caps and ratios have the potential to be irrational for rea-
sons similar to the irrationality of net-worth evidence, but in the oppo-
site direction. There is no reason to suppose that the deterrence gap
will correspond to a particular ratio of actual damages. If the claim is
readily detectable and easily prosecutable, then the gap will be a frac-
tion of the damages; if the defendant's conduct, on the other hand, is
difficult to discover, and involves expensive, high-risk litigation, then a
ratio of two to one, for example, may be inadequate to address the
deterrence gap. An absolute-dollar figure may be equally nonsensical,
if not more so. Clandestine conduct that causes significant damage
may result in a deterrence gap that exceeds the absolute-dollar cap.2 76
Perhaps, however, ratios are not as irrational as either absolute
caps or net-worth evidence. They at least relate punitive damages to
actual harm, even if they do so only in specific cases. Perhaps
econometrics could tell us whether a multiple of two, three, or four
would be appropriate in the economy overall as an approximation of
271. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
272. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 13.
274. See supra note 14.
275. See Hurd & Zollers, supra note 25, at 195 (describing different variations of caps
and multipliers used in legislative tort reform).
276. Thus, the prefatory note to the Model Act implies that these devices may be "arbi-
trary." See MODEL PUNTIVE DAMAGES Ac-r prefatory note para. 20 (1996) ("The Drafting
Committee felt that it could improve upon the procedure, burden of proof, judicial review,
and similar matters so that arbitrary monetary limitations may not be necessary." (emphasis
added)).
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the deterrence gap.2 77 Statutes capping punitive damages by multi-
ples may be based upon guesstimates of this computation. Even so, a
ratio approach would undercompensate for the gap in some kinds of
cases, such as those involving repetitive conduct producing small dam-
ages,278 while overcompensating for the gap in others, particularly
those where the conduct is discoverable and results in high actual-
damage awards.279
Perhaps ratios or caps make more sense in deontological terms.
The most cherished horror stories about punitive damages have to do
with punitives so excessive that they seem unrelated to actual harm
(e.g., hundred-to-one or greater ratios). 280 Even if the deterrence gap
is large because the conduct is repetitive and causes small injuries,
hundred-to-one awards engender disrespect for the law.28 1 They of-
fend the concepts of proportionality and retributive justice.282
In summary, punitive-damage caps, particularly by way of ratios,
can be defended on deontological grounds and, to a lesser degree, by
economic reasoning. Their defensibility, however, depends upon
their functioning as upper limits, rather than as routine caps. In
other words, these figures should be set high enough so that they do
not impair the function of punitive damages in filling the deterrence
gap.
3. Evidence of Underdeterrence from Economic Models-or of the Likeli-
hood of Escape from Liability.--In theory, one might speculate that the
277. This computation would be accomplished by comparison of the statewide total of
actual damages recovered, with estimates of the total amount of actual harm caused by
tortious behavior during the same period, including that which was not compensated.
278. A typical example is that of an insurer that strategically denies small claims in bad
faith because it believes that most are too small to litigate, so that the rare loss due to a
compensatory award (perhaps even with small-cap punitives) is overwhelmed by unlawful
gains. Cf Dobbs, supra note 220, at 866 (using the example in a slightly different context
to show how extra compensatory damages would continue to be awarded under a deter-
rence-measure system of punitive-damage awards).
279. That is, it will overcompensate if the ratio or cap is the principal limit and if other,
misleading guidance (such as net-worth evidence) is all that directs the jury.
280. Cf BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1603 (1996) (noting that "[w]hen
the ratio is a breathtaking 500 to 1, however, the award must surely 'raise a suspicious
judicial eyebrow'" (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliances Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443,
482 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting))).
281. For example, the famous McDonald's coffee case arguably featured a large deter-
rence gap, and yet the size of the award engendered disrespect for the law. See supra note
2. It is plausible to maintain that this disrespect should not have resulted in reduction of
the award, because it may not have been based on a full public appreciation of the evi-
dence. The trial judge's response was to find that McDonald's was "willful" and "reckless,"
to uphold the punitive finding, but to remit most of the amount. See supra note 2.
282. See supra Part II.B.
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best kind of evidence to determine a punitive award would come from
economic measurement of the deterrence gap. Expert witnesses
would attempt to convey to the jury the information contained in Fig-
ure 2, above, as applied to the specific case. This would require an
economist to testify concerning his estimates of the typical firm's mar-
ginal cost curve, as well as the marginal cost curve that results when
actual damages are added. Then, this expert would estimate-and
perhaps sketch for the jury-the social marginal cost curve. The dol-
lar value of the deterrence gap would emerge from this process. If the
estimates were accurate, the punitive award would be economically
efficient,2 83 and it also would serve deontological purposes, 284 pro-
vided that its effects could be adequately communicated to the jury
and the public.
The theoretical accuracy of this methodology, however, is
matched only by its empirical indeterminacy. As is indicated above,
marginal cost curves are difficult and expensive to derive; so too are
projections of actual damages. 285 And for the social marginal cost
curve, dollar estimates must be placed upon aesthetics, environmental
preservation, tolerance of risks, and for that matter, human life it-
self.2 86 And all of this indeterminacy is aside from the issue of the
admissibility, and the partisanship, of expert testimony.287 One would
expect plaintiffs' and defendants' estimates of each of the relevant fac-
tors to differ wildly. A wide variety of damage models might be argua-
ble for each of the ingredients. The trial judge would face significant
difficulties in determining, pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,288 the "reliability" and "fit" of the testimony thus
proffered.289 In summary, this kind of evidence is the most accurate
and desirable in theory, but it often would be difficult to present in
practice.
As an alternative to the kind of diffuse evidence that would meas-
ure underdeterrence economically, Polinsky and Shavell argue that
the punitive award should depend upon the likelihood that the de-
283. See supra Part I.B.
284. The deontological purpose would be served because the punitive award would be
related to the wrongfulness of the conduct. See supra Part II.B.
285. See supra Part IIA.2.
286. See supra Part II.A.1.
287. See Stan V. Smith, Pseudo-Economists: The New Junk Scientists, 47 FED'N INS. & CORP.
COUNS. Q. 95, 95-103 (1996) (arguing that economists as witnesses may be prone to lack of
qualification and to biased economic assessments).
288. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
289. Id. at 597. See generally G. Michael Fenner, The Daubert Handbook: The Case, Its
Essential Dilemma, and Its Progeny, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 939 (1996) (thoroughly reviewing
the issues raised by Daubert).
2251998]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
fendant might have escaped having to pay for the harm for which she
should be responsible.2"' Indeed, they argue that the estimation of
this factor should be the principal task of the jury in fixing the
amount, with a resulting multiplier supplied to the jury in a table, to
be applied to the actual damages to compute a base amount that then
would be adjusted by other specified factors. This factor, the likeli-
hood of escape, suggests that several kinds of evidence might be rele-
vant. For example, other instances of similar conduct that escaped
detection are circumstantial indicators of the probability of nondetec-
tion in this case. The presence or absence of persons or agencies that
would cause detection is another indicator. Furthermore, efforts by
the defendant to conceal the conduct would be circumstantially rele-
vant, as would openness by the defendant, to the opposite effect. Po-
linsky and Shavell's system is comprehensive enough, and yet precisely
targeted enough, so that it may provide a sound means of guiding the
jury toward a rough estimate of the deterrence gap.
4. "Profitability" Evidence. -As an alternative to evidence about
the deterrence gap, perhaps the profitability of the conduct at issue
can be examined in some kinds of cases.29 Perhaps it could be deter-
mined more readily than could the deterrence gap,292 although it still
would involve evidence from experts based upon models, with all of
the indeterminacy that these two factors entail.293
On the other hand, some cases may not be fit for profitability
evidence. 294 An accident, after all, is accidental; it may involve aberra-
tional conduct. If a particular employee, for example, embarks upon
a course of embezzlement that is not detected by the firm's account-
290. POLINSKY & SHAVELL, supra note 52, at 8-9, 24-34. The authors propose a set ofjury
instructions telling jurors that their "principal" task is to estimate this probability of escape.
Id. at 104-09. The multiplier is defined as (1-P)/P, where P is the probability of liability
(and 1-P therefore is the probability of escape). Thus, the multiplier ranges from 0 when
the probability is 0, and 0.11 when the probability is 0.1, up to 4.0 when it is 0.8, and 9.0
when it is 0.9. Id. at 110.
291. See Dobbs, supra note 220, at 868-88 (suggesting that the defendant's profit may be
the "best possible measure of extracompensatory damages... [although] it is not the only
one").
292. For example, it would not entail nearly so much indeterminacy caused by incom-
mensurate social values. See supra Part II.A.2.
293. On the one hand, economic modeling is admissible as relevant to many kinds of
issues, ranging from liability questions for claims such as antitrust violations to computa-
tion of compensatory damages. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. On the other
hand, determining the profitability of a tortious act requires judgments about allocation to
legitimate or illegitimate factors. See supra Part III.B.3. These judgments may be particu-
larly sensitive to partisan manipulation. See supra note 287.
294. See generally Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) (involving a mis-
appropriation of insurance premiums and a finding of fraud).
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ing controls, it may be difficult to estimate the "profitability" of the
course of conduct to the firm.295 In this event, it is unlikely that the
firm itself has profited; its accounting controls were set up precisely to
prevent the event. Estimating the profitability of using this particular
system of accounting controls, as versus that of another, would be bet-
ter than pure profit evidence, but this factor may be difficult to meas-
ure and seems far removed from the deterrence gap for which it is
supposed to serve as a surrogate.
Also, "profitability" is not easy to define, and it readily can be
misunderstood. It has more obvious meaning in the case of an eco-
nomic actor, as opposed to one who acts on non-market motives, such
as a sexual harasser or a murderer.296 Furthermore, this kind of rea-
soning should not be taken as a reason to penalize a firm simply be-
cause it has shown a profit overall. Profit, or payment for
entrepreneurship, management, and use of capital, is an essential part
of the market system.297 It is not a sign that the firm is doing some-
thing wrong; instead, it is more often a sign that the firm is doing
something right. Assessing punitive damages in whopping amounts
merely because the firm earned a twenty-percent profit last year, or in
small amounts because it earned two percent, would be as irrational
both economically and deontologically as basing the amount on its
net worth.
298
Furthermore, it is equally irrational to base punitive damages on
the profitability of the activity or product that was associated with the
damage. Usually, this factor will involve a socially desirable good or
service: the providing of medicines, the selling of banking services, or
the serving of coffee. Thus, for example, it was fallacious (or at least
imprecise) for plaintiffs counsel in the McDonald's coffee case to
urge a determination of punitive damages based on a multiple of sev-
eral days' worth of coffee sales, or even coffee profit for that matter.299
295. See id. The profit approach in such a case may fairly measure punitive damages for
an employee, who acted intentionally, but not for the company whose liability is based
either upon inadvertence or upon a non-fault theory such as respondeat superior.
296. Thus, the punitive damages in such a case might better be assessed on the basis of
the more nebulous but arguably better targeted factors in the BMW case. See supra Part
II.B.2.
297. See SAMUELSON & NoRIAus, supra note 52, at 660-61, 745-47 (discussing how prof-
its influence factors of production and total product).
298. See supra Part III.B.1.
299. See Damage Award Cut in McDonald's Case, supra note 2. Given the crude condition
of current evidence law governing this issue, however, it is arguable that counsel may have
been operating at the state of the art in so arguing. See generally S. Reed Morgan, McDon-
ald's Burned Itself, TEX. LAw., Sept. 12, 1994, at 18, available in LEXIS, News Library, Txlawr
File (offering the perspective of the plaintiff's lawyer who tried the case).
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Selling coffee was not what McDonald's did that arguably was wrong,
and this measure had only a distant relationship to the deterrence
gap.
Instead, profitability inquiries would need to be more carefully
focused, if their probative value is to avoid being eclipsed by their
tendency to prejudice or mislead. The issue, at minimum, should be
narrowed to the gain in productivity achieved by the arguably wrong-
ful act of McDonald's of overheating its coffee. This act, not the sell-
ing of coffee, was the legitimate focus of the deterrence function of
the tort system. 300 Determining the answer to this more narrow in-
quiry may require more sophistication, and therefore more complex-
ity, than sales or profitability figures alone, but in Rule 403 terms, the
gain in probative value and the avoidance of prejudice are worth the
greater complexity.
30 1
If these precautions are observed, profitability may be a valid fac-
tor in some cases. It particularly would be useful in cases involving
repetitive conduct with small but significant damages. The fast-food
restaurant that serves dangerously heated coffee and externalizes the
cost of injuries, for example, can estimate the cost savings related to
this conduct and the arguably decreased sales that would result from
underheated coffee. The plaintiff, through an expert witness who
considers data provided by the fast-food firm, can make an alternate
estimate. The result often would be correlated with underdeterrence,
particularly if combined with evidence of the number of resulting in-
juries. Although the correlation would be inexact, it would be practi-
cal to produce this evidence before a jury.
5. Evidence of Other Conduct of the Defendant-or of Other Recoveries,
Actual or Punitive, for the Same Conduct.--One particularly striking case
involving other-conduct evidence is John Deere Co. v. May,3" 2 in which
the plaintiffs obtained judgment in a product liability action against
the John Deere Company, whose bulldozer ran over and killed the
plaintiffs' decedent.3 3 The plaintiffs offered evidence of thirty-four
other incidents in which John Deere bulldozers allegedly had shifted
into gear while standing in neutral with their engines running. 0 4 The
appellate court upheld the admissibility of this evidence, in part as
300. See supra Part I.A.1.
301. FED. R. EVID. 403 (excluding evidence if its relevance is "substantially outweighed"
by counterweights).
302. 773 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. App. 1989, writ denied).
303. Id. at 371.
304. Id.
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relevant to punitive damages: "Furthermore, they [plaintiffs] could
recover exemplary damages if they proved that John Deere knew of
the greater danger but acted with conscious indifference. '"3 5
The issue in May was primarily whether the evidence was "sub-
stantially similar"30 6 to the event on trial, and whether it passed the
Rule 403 test.30 7 The evidence was admitted primarily for the purpose
of determining liability.3"' However, if admitted to determine
recoverability of punitive damages, it presumably also would be rele-
vant to determination of the amount. In some cases, particularly
where a regular pattern of injuries from the course of conduct can be
derived, this evidence, together with profitability evidence, can be use-
ful.30 9 For example, the fast-food firm that serves super-heated coffee
arguably is taking advantage of a deterrence gap if its product has
caused numerous injuries, similar to the one on trial, without having
to pay damages and without changing its course of conduct. 310
But repetitive-accident evidence is prejudicial. As the May court
put it, "Extraneous incidents ...can be extremely harmful to the
defense."311 When such evidence is submitted on punitive damages,
either for liability or for amount, the court should take care to ensure
that the incidents are substantially similar or relate to the same course
of conduct.3 12 The court also should undertake a Rule 403 balancing
before admitting the evidence.313
A separate issue relates to the availability of credit against puni-
tive damages for other compensatory or punitive awards paid. 1 4 Such
evidence is relevant because it reduces the size of the deterrence gap
in economic terms; it also is prejudicial, however, because it injects
305. Id. at 373.
306. Id. at 372.
307. Id. at 373-74 (citing TEX. R. CIv. EVID. 403, which states that relevant evidence may
be excluded on special grounds); see also supra notes 237-238 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing FED. R. EVID. 403).
308. May, 773 S.W.2d at 377-79.
309. See id. at 374 (reasoning that proof of one hundred other occurrences, in addition
to the documented thirty-four instances, would have increased the probability that the
death of plaintiffs decedent occurred as plaintiff alleged).
310. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
311. May, 773 S.W.2d at 374.
312. See id. at 372-73 (articulating "[w]hat constitutes reasonably similar circumstances
under the facts presented").
313. Cf id. at 373-74 (applying TEX. R. Clv. EVID. 403 to determine whether the relevant
evidence should be excluded because its probative value is "substantially outweighed" by
the danger of unfair prejudice that would result from its admission); see also supra notes
237-238 and accompanying text (discussing FED. R. EVID. 403).
314. See MODEL PUNITVE DAMAGES AcT § 10 (1996) (allowing a court to credit any judg-
ment sought to be enforced if it determines that the judgments are unfairly duplicative).
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the fact of other verdicts or settlements against the defendant. There
are several ways in which this problem could be addressed. First, the
trial before the jury could be bifurcated, with the issue of credit to be
determined in the latter hearing.31 5 A second and probably better
approach, however, would be to have the credit determined by the
court alone. In some instances, the amount of the credit may be de-
terminable as a matter of law.3 16 When it is not so determinable, the
credit involves the kinds of calculations a court of equity would make,
and therefore, it should be done by a judge without the intervention
of a jury. 17 Finally, the credit issue is closely related to the judge's
review of the sufficiency of evidence to uphold the verdict, both for
judgment as a matter of law and remittitur purposes.31 8
C. Evidence for the Jury, Rather Than Mere Law for the Court
Many other kinds of evidence might be arguably relevant to the
economic and moral purposes of punitive damages. For example, evi-
dence of efforts to conceal the wrongful course of conduct, or destruc-
tion of evidence, has become admissible in some cases. 319 Broad
objectives such as the need to "punish" or "deter," or global character-
izations such as the "reprehensibility" of the defendant's conduct, are
used in some of the cases.320 Presumably, these issues are related to
such factors as the magnitude of expected losses, the profitability of
the wrongful conduct, and the deterrence gap.
What is striking, however, is that sometimes jurors are given virtu-
ally no information that is closely associated with the deterrence gap
when asked to determine punitive awards. 32' They may be provided
little in the way of instructions about the appropriate range of
315. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
316. This would be the case, for example, if the number and size of other instances to
be credited is mathematically determinable, and the overlap of the punitive awards is not
genuinely at issue.
317. If, for example, the different situations involve similar but not identical conduct,
the punitive-credit considerations resemble those in Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412
(1987), which held that although the water pollution penalty case was subject to jury-trial
right, the right did not override Congress's determination that the judge alone should
compute the penalty. Id. at 425-27.
318. Cf MODEL PUNITIVE DAMAGES ACr § 10 cmt. (1996) (explaining the requirements
of the trial court in attempting to decide whether a reduction or credit should be granted).
319. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1596 (1996) (reviewing evidence
of BMW's nondisclosure policy regarding refinished cars in the assessment of the punitive
award).
320. See, e.g., id. at 1599 ("Perhaps the most important indicium of the reasonableness of
a punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct.").
321. See infra notes 329-333 and accompanying text.
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amounts.3 2 2 Even when they are given instructions, they frequently
are not given particularized evidence focused on the amount of puni-
tive damages (except the irrational factor of net worth) .323 As the pre-
ceding sections suggest, the use of some sort of evidence that serves to
determine the relationship of the award to economic and deontologi-
cal purposes-such as ratios, profitability of the wrongful conduct,
and repetitiveness and seriousness of injuries in other cases-probably
would improve the jury's function. 2 4 Many of these types of evidence
can and should be presented in the latter stage of a bifurcated trial,
only after the jury has found liability for punitive damages under cor-
rect legal standards.
In such cases as BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore 2' and Pacific
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,3 26 the Supreme Court has consid-
ered the constitutional limits on punitive awards. 27 As is developed
in the second Part of this Article, BMWcreates substantive limits upon
the absolute amount of punitive awards by a three-factor test, involv-
ing the "degree of reprehensibility" of the defendant's conduct, the
ratio between plaintiff's actual loss and the punitive award, and other
civil or criminal sanctions available for comparable misconduct.
3 28
The Haslip case, on the other hand, had to do with the instructions
used to control the jury's discretion; there, the jury had been told
nothing beyond the fact that it had "discretion" to award punitive
damages to "punish" the defendants and to "protect[ ] the public." 2 9
In dissenting, Justice O'Connor pointed out that the State's punitive-
damages scheme already required the trial court to consider "a list of
seven factors .. .relevant to the size of a punitive damages award":
"'(1) Punitive damages should bear a reasonable rela-
tionship to the harm that is likely to occur from the defend-
ant's conduct as well as to the harm that actually has
occurred. If the actual or likely harm is slight, the damages
should be relatively small. If grievous, the damages should
be much greater.
322. See infta notes 331-332 and accompanying text.
323. See supra Part III.B.1.
324. See supra Part III.B.2-5.
325. 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
326. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
327. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1604 (holding that a grossly excessive punitive award tran-
scends the constitutional limit); Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23-24 (holding that the common-law
method for assessing punitive damages is not per se unconstitutional).
328. See supra notes 207-217 and accompanying text.
329. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 19 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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"'(2) The degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct should be considered. The duration of this con-
duct, the degree of the defendant's awareness of any hazard
which his conduct has caused or is likely to cause, and any
concealment or "cover-up" of that hazard, and the existence
and frequency of similar past conduct should all be relevant
in determining this degree of reprehensibility.
"'(3) If the wrongful conduct was profitable to the de-
fendant, the punitive damages should remove the profit and
should be in excess of the profit, so that the defendant rec-
ognizes a loss.
"'(4) The financial position of the defendant would be
relevant.
"'(5) All the costs of litigation should be included, so as
to encourage plaintiffs to bring wrongdoers to trial.
"'(6) If criminal sanctions have been imposed on the
defendant for his conduct, this should be taken into account
in mitigation of the punitive damages award.
"'(7) If there have been other civil actions against the
same defendant, based on the same conduct, this should be
taken into account in mitigation of the punitive damages
award. '330
The problem that Justice O'Connor saw, however, was that
"[u] nfortunately.... [the state] courts do not give ... [these] factors
to the jury." 31 She argued that later application of the factors on
appeal "does not cure the vagueness of the jury instructions.... After-
the-fact review of the amount in no way diminishes the fact that the
State entrusts its juries with standardless discretion." 2
Justice O'Connor has a point. Even if one does not agree with
her as a matter of constitutional law, it would make sense to provide
the jury with more guidance than to instruct them, as Justice
O'Connor paraphrased it, with nothing more than, "[t]hink about
how much you hate what the defendants did and teach them a les-
son."333 As a matter of state law, it would make sense to use many of
330. Id. at 51-52 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.
2d 218, 223-24 (Ala. 1989) (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 505 So. 2d 1050, 1062
(Ala. 1987) (Houston, J., concurring specially))). In Hornsby, these factors were promul-
gated for court review, but not as jury instructions. See Hornsby, 539 So. 2d at 223.
331. Haslip, 499.U.S. at 52 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
332. Id.
333. Id. at 49; see also POLINSKY & SHAVELL, supra note 52, at 104-10 (setting out proposed
jury instructions implementing the authors' theory that likelihood of escape from liability
should be used to derive a multiplier that can be applied to actual damages to compute a
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these factors in jury instructions and also to allow evidence about
them.
Of the seven Haslip factors listed above, the fourth should be ex-
cluded. The "financial position of the defendant" is not sufficiently
relevant to either economic or deontological bases for punitive dam-
ages to compensate for its tendency to prejudice and mislead.3 4 The
sixth and seventh factors-composed of criminal sanctions and civil
damages actually paid by the defendant for similar conduct-should
not be given to the jury, for the reasons stated above. Instead, they
should be considered by the court alone, as adjustments to the jury's
award.3 3 5 But, consistently with the critiques set out above,3 3 6 the
other Haslip factors-the first, second, third, and fifth-should be
provided to the jury in appropriate instructions from the court. In
addition, evidence relevant to those factors should be admissible, pro-
vided it passes the test of Rule 403.
CONCLUSION
Determination of the amount of a punitive award should be con-
trolled primarily by economic analysis. The ultimate measure should
be the size of the deterrence gap created by failures of injured persons
fully to recover all losses. In theory, if this amount could be com-
puted, it would supplement the compensatory award in a way that
would optimize the allocation of resources between production and
safety. The alternative approach of concentrating principally on
blameworthiness confounds the accuracy of the process because of
the greater difficulty of fixing and evaluating this philosophical ab-
straction. Furthermore, except in the instance of deliberate violation
of a clear rule or norm, blameworthiness is associated with unjustified
risk and with probabilities of nonliability, and these factors are corre-
lated with the deterrence gap.
But economic analysis cannot be the exclusive ingredient in all
such determinations. There must be allowance for informational defi-
ciencies. This factor may result in situations in which a less precise
base punitive award, which then is to be modified in other ways specified by the
instructions).
334. See supra Part III.B.1.
335. See supra notes 314-318 and accompanying text.
336. See supra Part III.B.2-5. See generally Thomas M. Melsheimer & Steven H. Stodghill,
Due Process and Punitive Damages: Providing Meaningful Guidance to the Jury, 47 SMU L. REv.
329 (1994) (advocating that juries be given careful instructions that not only detail the
purposes of punitive damages but also provide some benchmarks by which they should be
calculated).
337. See supra note 313.
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measure may be superior if it is more workable. In addition, moral
considerations should provide a reality check against disproportion-
ately low or high awards. As Professor Hurd explains the matter, con-
sequentialist theories such as economic analysis provide the more
general solution, and "the principal payoff of deontological maxims is
their ability to define and patrol the borders of consequential justifica-
tion." 8 The constitutional decisions emphasize moral blameworthi-
ness and proportionality,339  and this deontological focus is
appropriate for those kinds of questions, although it would not be a
good guide to calculation in the typical case.
In a few kinds of cases, it might be appropriate for expert wit-
nesses to estimate the size of the deterrence gap by economic models
and to provide this information to jurors by their testimony. Partisan
manipulation of the results, however, is a severe impediment to the
use of this evidence, given the problems of incommensurability and
uncertainty. 340 Perhaps, nevertheless, there are some kinds of cases in
which it will be realistic to use this evidence, such as those involving
commercially measurable losses, a defined universe of claims, and
ready analysis of defendants' production costs.
As an alternative method of approaching the problem, it might
be better to use secondary but more readily determinable factors that
are related to the deterrence gap. Profitability evidence, for example,
generally should be admissible. It normally should be confined to the
profitability of the injuring practice, and it should not be measured by
the gains on legitimate, nontortious activity. Evidence of other events
similar to the injury at trial should be admissible, subject to Rule
403,41 in the second part of a bifurcated proceeding. Careful jury
instructions should tell the jurors both the purposes of punitive dam-
ages and the way in which the evidence should lead to the determina-
tion, which in turn should be explained simply in terms of the
deterrence gap.
Two types of evidence now in widespread use are inconsistent
with this approach, and they should be avoided. First, evidence of net
worth has little value in either economic or moral terms. The theoret-
ical relationship that it has to risk tolerance is weak and uncertain,
and it is dwarfed by the prejudice and tendency to mislead that such
evidence inevitably carries. Wealth evidence tends to inflate punitive
338. Hurd, supra note 177, at 254.
339. See supra notes 207-217 and accompanying text.
340. See supra note 287.
341. See FED. R. EVID. 403; see also supra notes 237-238 and accompanying text (discussing
Rule 403).
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damages arbitrarily, in ways that are unrelated to either the moral
blameworthiness of the defendant's conduct or to the deterrence gap.
Such evidence would be vehemently criticized if offered on any other
issue, and it is anomalous that it is admitted as a measure of punitive
damages.
Second, fixed-dollar caps exhibit the opposite kind of arbitrari-
ness in that they undervalue the deterrent in some cases. Caps based
upon ratios of punitives to compensatories also may be arbitrary, but
they have the virtue of tying the award to actual losses, which are re-
lated at least roughly to both the deterrence gap and to moral blame-
worthiness. The elimination of these two misleading devices, net-
worth evidence and fixed caps, would go far toward improving our
regimes for determining punitive damages, and a focus on the deter-
rence gap would bring us closer to a system that would avoid assessing
amounts that are either too large or too small.
